Stability of international climate treaties : The importance of heterogeneity by Andersson, Runa Haave
  
 
 
Stability of international climate 
treaties  
 
The importance of heterogeneity  
 
Runa Haave Andersson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis for the degree 
Master of Economic Theory and Econometrics 
 
Department of Economics  
 
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO  
 
January 10, 2013 
 
II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
III 
 
 
 
STABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL 
CLIMATE TREATIES 
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF HETEROGENEITY 
 
 
 
  
IV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Runa Haave Andersson 
2013 
Stability of international climate treaties – the importance of heterogeneity 
Runa Haave Andersson 
http://www.duo.uio.no/ 
Trykk: Reprosentralen, Universitetet i Oslo 
V 
 
Preface 
I want to thank my main supervisor, Karine Nyborg, for all her time spent discussing every 
part of this thesis with me and for thoroughly reading all previous versions of it. Her 
contributions have been invaluable. 
I also want to thank Statistics Norway for letting me use an office and all their resources. In 
particular I want to thank my supervisor Bjart Holtsmark for introducing me to this topic and 
for his excellent guidance throughout this process. 
Finally, I want to thank Dritan Osmani for quickly providing me with the necessary links to 
the model description for the FUND model. 
  
VI 
 
  
VII 
 
Table of contents 
Preface ....................................................................................................................................... V 
Table of contents ..................................................................................................................... VII 
1 Introduction and summary .................................................................................................. 1 
2 Some basic theory ............................................................................................................... 4 
2.1 Pollution ....................................................................................................................... 4 
2.2 Market failure .............................................................................................................. 5 
2.3 International law .......................................................................................................... 6 
2.4 Game theory ................................................................................................................ 7 
2.5 International climate treaties ..................................................................................... 10 
3 The model ......................................................................................................................... 15 
3.1 Two identical countries ............................................................................................. 18 
3.2 16 individual countries .............................................................................................. 19 
3.3 Heterogeneous countries ............................................................................................ 23 
4 The parameters .................................................................................................................. 27 
4.1 Regional parameters .................................................................................................. 27 
4.2 The parameters of country i ....................................................................................... 30 
4.3 The value of the parameters bi and ci ......................................................................... 34 
5 Numerical results .............................................................................................................. 38 
5.1 The efficiency index and the environmental index ................................................... 40 
5.2 Internally stable coalitions ......................................................................................... 42 
5.3 Potentially internally stable coalitions ....................................................................... 45 
5.4 Non-internally stable coalitions ................................................................................. 48 
5.5 Interpretation and discussion ..................................................................................... 50 
6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 55 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................. 57 
VIII 
 
 
List of tables 
Table 2.1 – The Prisoners’ Dilemma..........................................................................................9 
Table 3.1 – An abatement game between two countries ........................................................18 
Table 3.2 – The payoff for members (m) and non-members (n) and global payoff and 
abatement when there is a coalition with k members…….……............................................21 
Table 4.1 – The FUND model………………………………………………………………..28 
Table 4.2 – Region r’s total population and emissions and the recalculated region 
parameters……………………………………………………………………………………..29 
Table 4.3 – List of countries within the 16 regions in FUND……………………………..35 
Table 4.4 – Population, emissions, relative emissions and parameter values for country i…37 
Table 5.1 – BaU and social optimum………………………………………………………..39 
Table 5.2 – The overall best performing internally stable coalition: China and the US……43 
Table 5.3 – An internally stable coalition with 11 members ……………………….……….44 
Table 5.4 – The overall worst performing internally stable coalition……………………….45 
Table 5.5 – The potentially internally stable coalition with the highest efficiency index…..46 
Table 5.6 – The potentially internally stable coalition with the highest environmental 
index………………………….………...………………………………..……………………47 
Table 5.7 – The overall worst performing coalition…………………………………………47 
Table 5.8 – The coalition with the highest environmental index…………………………….49 
Table 5.9 – The coalition without Japan, the Republic of Korea and Australia……………..49 
Table 5.10 – Results for ten key coalitions………………………………………………...…50 
 
List of figures 
Figure 3.1 – The stability of a coalition with k members.....................................................22 
Figure 5.1 – The efficiency index depending on coalition size……………………………..41 
Figure 5.2 – The environmental index depending on coalition size …………………………42 
e 
 
  
1 
 
1 Introduction and summary 
Climate change presents serious global risks that require global collective action in response; 
see for example IPCC (2007) and the Stern Review (2006). The challenge is to make global 
cooperation work. Climate change is therefore a central topic in international politics today, 
and has been for the last two decades. Nevertheless, little is happening on a global scale to 
reduce emissions and stabilise the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.  
From a theoretical point of view this is not surprising. Existing literature on international 
climate treaties indicates that international cooperation will not succeed in solving the 
problem of climate change. A main reason for this is that it is much more profitable for each 
individual country to stay out of an agreement and let the other countries do all the work. 
Everybody wants to be a free-rider.  
This thesis, however, presents a somewhat optimistic view. I will use a linear 
benefit/quadratic cost model to analyse possible coalitions between 16 independent countries. 
My approach is based on an analysis by Bjart Holtsmark (2013), where he uses a set of 
spreadsheets containing a calculation procedure of his own design to look at the stability 
properties of all possible coalitions between 16 parties (to be specified below). Holtsmark 
(2013, p. 3) bases his calculations “on non-cooperative game theory and the concept of stable 
coalitions as originally conceived by d’Aspremont et al. (1983)”. He examines possible 
coalitions between 16 world regions, where the parameter values were estimated by Osmani 
and Tol (2009). 
As Holtsmark (2013) mentions, single countries represented by their government are the 
relevant parties in international negotiations. A model of international climate treaties should 
therefore have individual countries, not groups of countries, as units. When there are 16 
potential parties to a treaty, there are 65 519 possible coalitions with at least two members. 
With a larger number of parties, the number of possible coalitions is also much larger. Ideally 
the model should include all countries that are affected by emissions of climate gases, i.e. all 
the countries in the world. The task of examining all possible coalitions with at least two 
members for every country in the world is, however, too massive for this thesis. 
I have applied Holtsmark’s spreadsheets as basis for the results in this thesis. I had to choose 
16 countries to include in the model and then estimate the necessary parameters based on the 
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estimations of Osmani and Tol. These parameter values allow me to get numerical results on 
the possible coalitions from Holtsmark’s spreadsheets.  
The countries that have the highest emissions are also the countries that can contribute most to 
total reduction in emissions on a global scale. I have therefore in this thesis decided to include 
the European Union in addition to the 15 countries with the highest emissions of CO2.
1
 Those 
countries are: China, the United States of America, the Russian Federation, India, Japan, 
Canada, the Republic of Korea, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mexico, South Africa, Australia, 
Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Ukraine and Indonesia. 
The European Union is a union of several individual countries. However, since the European 
Union can make decisions that are binding for its member states (Barrett, 2003) and the union 
negotiate internationally as a single unit, it is natural to include EU as a single party in the 
model.  
In chapter 2 I will briefly present the parts of environmental economic theory that are of 
relevance to understanding the model I will use in this thesis. The model itself will be 
presented in chapter 3, where I will solve it first for two identical countries, then for 16 
identical countries. I finally introduce the model with 16 heterogeneous countries in section 
3.3.  
In chapter 4 I go through the methodological and theoretical foundation for my own 
parameter calculations. These are, as previously noted, based on parameters presented in the 
paper “Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements” by Osmani and 
Tol (2009). The choice of the FUND model and the modification of these parameters are 
inspired by Holtsmark (2013). At the end of the chapter I present my final parameter 
calculations.  
In chapter 5 I present the numerical results from using my parameters in Holtsmark’s 
spreadsheets (2013) and discuss some key coalitions. The spreadsheets are based on the 
model formulation presented in section 3.3 and calculates the payoffs and abatement level for 
each country in each of the 65 520 possible coalitions (including the outcome where no 
countries cooperate). The spreadsheets also calculate the global payoff and the global 
abatement for each coalition and rate the coalitions according to global payoff and global 
                                                                
1 In 2005 (the World Bank, 2005a) 
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abatement – relative to global payoff and global abatement in the two extremes where no one 
cooperates and where everyone cooperates.  
This is a brief summary of my findings from chapter 5: 
The spreadsheets calculate which coalitions are internally stable and which coalitions are 
potentially internally stable. As expected, there are relatively few internally stable coalitions. 
Some internally stable coalitions do, however, have a large number of members. These large 
coalitions unfortunately do not perform well in terms of relative global abatement (or in terms 
of relative global payoff).  
The majority of the 65 520 possible outcomes are potentially internally stable when side 
payments are introduced. While not even the best performing internally stable coalitions have 
high relative global abatement, a large number of the potentially internally stable do. By 
allowing for side payments in this thesis, we massively increase the gains of potential 
cooperation. The main conclusion of this thesis is that when we have a model with 
heterogeneous countries and allow for side payments we can get quite close to the social 
optimum (as defined later in the thesis).  
While a coalition also needs to be externally stable in order to be self-enforcing (according to 
the definition of self-enforceability introduced later in this thesis) I do not calculate external 
stability. This is mainly because calculating this is outside the scope of this thesis. I could also 
argue that internal stability is the most interesting concept; while external stability ensures 
that no outsider wants to be part of the treaty, internal stability ensures that no member wants 
to leave the treaty. Forcing a sovereign state to stay on as a member of a treaty is not possible 
according to international law. However, forming an exclusive treaty with restrictive 
membership is possible. 
Chapter 6 is the conclusion. In addition to briefly commenting on the main results from 
chapter 4 and 5, I also point out some interesting questions I have not had time to answer in 
this thesis. 
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2  Some basic theory 
2.1 Pollution 
All economic activity takes place within the natural environment, i.e. the earth and its 
atmosphere. Resources extracted from the environment are used as inputs in production or 
directly in consumption (Perman et al., 2011, ch. 2). Both consumption and production give 
rise to waste products, or residuals, that are released back to the environment. The emission of 
residuals that are perceived to be harmful is called pollution (Perman et al., 2011, ch. 2). 
According to the materials balance principle matter can neither be created nor destroyed 
(Perman et al., 2011, ch. 2). Matter extracted from the environment is simply transformed to 
make it more useful to humans, and the mass not contained in these products is discharged as 
waste and returned to the environment. Residuals are thus the unintended by-products of the 
transformation process, and pollutants are residuals that harm the environment (Perman et al., 
2011, ch. 2). 
The mixing of the pollutant refers to how it spreads out after it is emitted (Perman et al., 2011, 
ch. 5). A pollutant is uniformly mixing if it spreads out equally over the relevant space; all 
that matters is how much is emitted in total, not the source or the location of the emissions. 
One example is the emission of most green-house gases (Perman et al., 2011, ch. 5). 
The harmful effect of pollution is often referred to as the damage from pollution. The damage 
depends either on the stock or the flow of the pollutant (or a mix of the two). The flow of a 
pollutant is the rate at which it is discharged into the environment and the stock is the 
accumulated concentration rate of the pollutant in the environment (Perman et al., 2011, ch. 
5). Damage that arises only from the flow of a pollutant will instantly drop to zero when the 
emission drops to zero. Damage that depends on the stock of pollution is affected by 
emissions only insofar as they add to the existing stock (Perman et al., 2011, ch. 5). Green-
house gases are typically stock pollutants. 
Pollution is per definition harmful and this, in isolation, indicates that pollution should be 
avoided. Assuming that rational producers have initially chosen production techniques that 
maximize their profits and that pollution is an unintended by-product of the production 
process, the producers either have to reduce production or invest in cleansing systems and/or 
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less polluting production technologies in order to reduce emissions (Perman et al., 2011, ch. 
5). Reducing emissions leads to less output and/or increased costs; this is the cost of 
abatement. Thus, there is a trade-off between the damage from pollution and the cost of 
reducing emissions (Perman et al., 2011, ch. 5).  
2.2 Market failure 
An allocation of resources is inefficient if it is possible to increase the welfare of one or more 
individuals without reducing the welfare of anyone else. Such inefficiencies often stem from 
some kind of market failure; when one or more of the conditions for a well-functioning 
market are not fulfilled.   
Externalities are examples of such a market failure. "By definition, an externality arises where 
the action of one party affects the set of outcomes attainable by another, and where this effect 
is not taken into account by the party undertaking the action" (Barrett, 2003, p. 75). An 
externality can originate in both production and consumption, and can have either positive or 
negative effects (Perman et al., 2011, ch. 4). The emission of green-house gases is a harmful 
externality. An externality is internalized if the generator(s) is forced to account for the 
unintended consequences; every activity has to have a price (Sandler, 1997).  
The Coase Theorem states that if property rights are well defined private bargaining between 
rational, self-interested individuals leads to efficient outcomes even in the presence of 
externalities (Stiglitz, 2006). There are, however, several examples of situations where 
property rights are difficult to define. 
The atmosphere is a global common property; no single state or individual can make binding 
decisions regarding the use of the atmosphere (Barrett, 2003, ch. 5). This implies that the 
Coase Theorem does not provide us with a solution to the problem of green-house gas 
emissions. 
We could consider the atmosphere as a public good. The existence of public goods is another 
reason for market failure. Two properties characterise pure public goods: non-rivalry and non-
excludability (Perman et al., 2011, ch. 4). Once a public good is made available, no one 
(payers and non-payers alike) can be prevented from consuming the good (non-excludability). 
One individual's consumption of the public good does not, in any way, hinder the 
consumption by others of that same unit of the good (non-rivalry) (Sandler, 1997). These 
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properties undermine the private incentive to provide and maintain the goods, and they are 
thus not readily provided by the market. By letting others provide the good (and pay the cost), 
it is possible to free-ride on the efforts of others (Sandler, 1997). When one can enjoy the 
good just as much anyway, why bother paying for it? If everyone reasons this way, the good 
may not be provided. It may be necessary for some sort of government to intervene in order to 
supply the goods, but in different ways and to a varying degree, depending on the specific 
characteristics of the good itself. As explained by Sandler (1997, p. 43): "The class of public 
goods is large and can vary in terms of the degree of non-rivalry and the extent of non-
excludability."  
Abatement of green-house gas emissions can also be seen as a global public good; every unit 
of abatement is to the benefit of everyone, not only those who pay for the abatement. 
There can be no externalities and no public goods if a market is to be defined as well-
functioning. In addition there must be perfect competition (no single actor can influence the 
prices) and perfect information (Stiglitz, 2006). Real markets are most often not well-
functioning, and efficient outcomes are often not realized (Perman et al., 2011, ch. 4). 
2.3 International law 
Why is there a basic difference in the difficulties of solving environmental problems at 
national and international levels?  
By different means, democratic or otherwise, a state can make general rules, or laws, to solve 
market failure at the national level. The government has the power to assign and enforce 
property rights, redistribute income, regulate externalities and provide (or maintain) public 
goods (Sandler, 1997). Conflicts can be brought before a national court, where the decisions 
of the court are legally binding and can be enforced, seeing as all citizens are bound by the 
laws of their nation (Barrett, 2003).  
Market failures at the international level, such as transborder externalities (externalities that 
arise across borders, and that affect several states), can only be corrected by voluntary 
cooperation between the affected parties (this and the following paragraphs are based on 
discussions in Barrett (2003)). International law must be recognised by all states the laws are 
meant to apply to, and a dispute can only be brought before the International Court of Justice 
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(the judicial organ of the UN) if all parties agree to it. Even if the parties do agree to go to 
court, no one has the authority to enforce the court's decision.  
Custom dictates that states are sovereign equals; they are entitled to administer their own 
affairs without foreign interference and have equal right to act internationally. States accept 
some limitations on their sovereignty, knowing that their actions may inadvertently infringe 
upon the rights of other states. Perhaps more importantly, the actions of other states may 
conflict with their own right not to be interfered with and they accept constraints themselves 
because they want other states to accept the same limitations.  
Customary law is a tradition-bound institution; it is not created, but evolves naturally. It's a 
pattern of behaviour that arises from repeated interaction between states and leads to 
expectations about how states should act internationally). Customary law is enforced by 
informal mechanisms, there are no formal mechanisms to force compliance and punish 
misbehaviour. Any state that deviates from existing custom must be prepared to defend 
themselves to other states that see this behaviour as being unlawful. A deviation might also 
encourage deviation in general, by eroding international cooperation. Unless they have good 
reasons not to, most states simply obey custom and behave as other states expect them to, 
even if it in isolated cases might not be in their own best interest.  
Treaties are used to facilitate transnational collective action (actions that require cooperation 
between at least two states to further the interests of them all) (Sandler, 1997), and are 
agreements between states specifying how they should behave. They are created through 
international deliberation and negotiations, and specify a set of rights and obligations (Barrett, 
2003). Each state comes to the negotiating table intent on getting the best possible deal for 
themselves, and while customary law dictates that all members should adhere to the treaty, it 
also dictates that each state is free to choose whether or not to sign the agreement (Barrett, 
2003).  
2.4 Game theory 
This thesis applies game theory; the concept is briefly introduced in this section (for a more 
thorough description of the subject, see Gibbons (1992) or Watson (2002)). Game theory can 
be used to gain some understanding about the underlying motivations of the participants in 
international negotiations. States guard their autonomy, and international cooperation is loose 
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as a result of this. They can therefore be compared to "game players that must choose their 
strategies based on their beliefs about the likely choices of others" (Sandler, 1997, p. 51).  
A player acts unilaterally if he is acting on his own behalf, without consulting anyone else. 
He acts in his own self-interest if he cares only about his own payoff, without regard for the 
payoff other players get (Barrett, 2003). When several actions give the same payoff, a player 
is indifferent between them. He will not prefer one above the other. 
According to Watson (2002, p. 5): “[g]ames are formal descriptions of strategic settings”. 
Formal implies a logically consistent and mathematically precise structure.  When the actions 
of one player are interdependent with the actions of other players and all players recognise 
this interdependence, the players behave strategically (Sandler, 1997). One player will try to 
anticipate what the other does, and act upon that. The other player anticipates that the first 
player will anticipate and acts according to this. Of course, this has already been anticipated 
by the first player, something the other also anticipates... And so on. A strategy is a set of 
strategic responses to every possible action of others. A player’s best response is the strategy 
that maximizes his payoff, given his belief about the action of the other players (Watson, 
2002). If one specific strategy always yields a higher payoff than the others, no matter what 
the other players do, that strategy is a dominant strategy (Watson, 2002).  
When a game has been played, an outcome is realized. Given that all players have played 
from their best responses, an outcome is strategically stable if no player will unilaterally want 
to deviate from their chosen strategy. Such a strategically stable outcome is called a Nash 
equilibrium (Watson, 2002). A game can have no, one or several Nash equilibrium outcomes. 
A Nash equilibrium is, however, not necessarily a Pareto efficient outcome (Watson, 2002). 
For an outcome to be Pareto efficient, all possible Pareto improvements must have been 
made. A Pareto improvement is possible when one player can be made better off without 
making any other player worse off. In some cases the players would all be better off if they all 
acted differently. If a Pareto efficient outcome is not a Nash equilibrium, it will not be 
realized as long as the players act unilaterally. That is because at least one of the players will 
do better by changing their position (given that the other players do not change theirs). To 
realize the Pareto efficient outcome the players then have to be able to coordinate upon and 
commit to a unified strategy. 
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There are, according to Sandler (1997), seventy-eight distinct 2 x 2 (a game with 2 players 
who have 2 choices each) game structures. The structure does not depend on specific payoffs, 
but on the ordering of the payoffs.
2
 The most famous game is the Prisoners' Dilemma. The 
story goes like this (Watson, 2002):
 3
 
Two criminals are taken into questioning by the police, suspected of committing a crime 
together. They are questioned separately. The police make them both an offer. If only one of 
them confesses, he will get a prison sentence of 1 year while the other gets a sentence of 2.5 
years. If both confess, they both get a sentence of 2 years. If none of them confesses, they will 
be charged with a minor offence and sentenced to 1.5 years each. Their choices are illustrated 
in table (2.1). Each cell shows the sentence for each criminal whether they confess or keep 
silent, given the choice of the other criminal. The first number in each cell is criminal 1’s 
sentence and the second is criminal 2’s sentence. 
 
 
 
 
 
To confess while the other keeps silent is the individually best outcome for each criminal. The 
next best outcome is when both keep silent. The third best outcome is when both confess, and 
the individually worst outcome for each criminal is to keep silent while the other confesses. 
The collectively best outcome, where their total prison sentence is minimized (at 3 years), is 
when both keep silent. This is a Pareto efficient outcome; it will not be possible to make one 
criminal better off without making the other worse off. It is not, however, a Nash equilibrium. 
Given that the other keeps silent, both criminals will want to deviate and confess, hoping to 
achieve the individually best outcome. There is one Nash equilibrium in this game and that is 
the outcome where both confess; the collectively worst outcome with a total prison sentence 
of 4 years. Given that the other criminal confesses, they can do no better than to confess 
                                                                
2 See Sandler (1997, p. 28) for a more thorough discussion.  
3 The general story is found in Watson on p. 31-32, though I use different numbers. 
  Criminal 2 
  Confess Keep silent 
C
ri
m
in
al
 1
 
Confess 2 2 1 2.5 
Keep silent 2.5 1 1.5 1.5 
  Table 2.1 – The Prisoners’ Dilemma 
The first number in each cell is criminal 1’s sentence and the second is criminal 2’s sentence. 
Based on theory presented in Watson (2002) 
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themselves. To confess is a dominant strategy; no matter what the other criminal does, the 
criminals can do no better than to confess. The Nash equilibrium is the only outcome in this 
game that is not Pareto efficient. 
This is the characteristic structure of a Prisoners' Dilemma; a game with a Pareto inefficient 
Nash equilibrium where one action is a dominant strategy for both players, but where both 
players would be better off if they were able to coordinate and commit to the other strategy. 
The Prisoners' Dilemma is routinely used to describe environmental problems because so 
many environmental problems seem to be examples of this game structure (Perman et al., 
2011, ch. 9). 
2.5 International climate treaties 
Solving a transboundary environmental problem requires international cooperation (Hoel, 
2005). By designing a suitable agreement it should be possible to make every country better 
off than they would be if they acted unilaterally (Hoel, 2005).  When states unilaterally make 
their optimal choice in the trade-off between environmental damage and the cost of reducing 
the damage, they will only consider their own costs and damages, taking the actions of other 
states as given. Simple actions may sometimes change incentive structures, so that self-
interested actors, who would not otherwise do so, behave in a way that promotes the common 
good (Sandler, 1997, p. 25). According to Barrett (2003, p. 355) "[t]he principal task of a 
treaty is to restructure incentives." Unfortunately, nations are, according to Sandler (1997, p. 
51), "calculating entities that serve their own interests." Reaching an agreement is difficult, 
since the states are different and will be affected differently by an agreement (Hoel, 2005).  
Free-riding is a hindrance to the success of international climate treaties (IEAs). Many 
transboundary environmental problems are uniformly mixing, so that it does not matter where 
the problem originates. Climate change is a problem of this sort. It does not matter where the 
emission of climate gases takes place. Only the total stock of pollutants matter. Similarly, it 
does not matter where the abatement takes place. If a state manages to stay outside an 
agreement, it can enjoy the benefits from the reduced emissions of the cooperating parties, 
without having to bear any of the costs of reducing emissions themselves (Hoel, 2005). When 
everyone wants to be a free-rider, no one is willing to committ to a treaty. This can be a huge 
problem even if all states are better off with the agreement than without (Hoel, 2005).  
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To make self-interested states agree on a treaty and comply to its commitments it has to be 
profitable for them to do so (Finus, 2004). It must also be self-enforcing. That is, it must 
change the incentives of the parties in such a way that they do not want to unilaterally deviate 
from the agreement. To be self-enforcing an agreement must, according to Barrett (2003, 
p. xiv), be individually rational, collectively rational and fair. The threats and promises stated 
in the treaty have to be credible, i.e. all parties must believe that threats and promises are 
feasible and that they will be carried out if necessary (Barrett, 2003).
4
 It is individually 
rational if the parties to the treaty have incentives to comply with and not withdraw from the 
agreement, given the choices of all other states. Furthermore, non-parties should have 
incentives neither to join the agreement nor change their present behaviour, given the choices 
of other states (Barrett, 2003). If it is not possible to gain collectively by changing the treaty, 
the agreement is collectively rational (Barrett, 2003). Scott Barrett (2003, p. xiv) claims that 
an agreement also needs to be fair in order to gain and keep the consent of all relevant parties.  
The efficiency of an agreement can be measured against estimated abatement levels in the 
absence of a treaty (Finus, 2004), what is often called the business as usual (BaU) level of 
emissions. Large coalitions may not necessarily be more efficient than small coalitions, since 
for small coalitions it may be easier to agree on ambitious abatement levels and enforce the 
treaty (Finus, 2004). If the abatement target (the level of abatement they want to reach) 
specified in the IEA equals the BaU level, participation and compliance will not be a problem 
(Finus, 2004). It is not difficult for a state to agree to do something it would have done 
anyway. An ambitious treaty is more likely to specify targets that forces states to abate more 
than they would have done unilaterally, making it more likely that they will not sign the treaty 
at all. When designing a treaty one is often faced with a trade-off between the depth (how 
ambitious the treaty is) and the breadth (how many participants there are) of cooperation 
(Barrett, 2003, ch. 14).  
Finus (2004) makes a distinction between two types of IEA-models: Membership models and 
compliance models. Within the membership models he further distinguishes between three 
                                                                
4 See Watson (2002) for a more precise definition of credibility 
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sub-groups; models using cooperative game theory, models using non-cooperative game 
theory and ‘new coalition theory’.5  
The following discussion of the different IEA-models is, unless otherwise stated, based on 
Finus (2004). 
Membership models are focused on coalition formation and the stability of membership. In 
this framework the central question is whether or not an agent is a party to an agreement. In 
the simplest form this is simply a decision of whether to abate or pollute. Free-riding in these 
models is not to be part of an agreement, i.e. to pollute. It is assumed that when an agent 
becomes a party to a treaty he will comply with its directives. 
States exhibit cooperative behaviour when they cooperate and make agreements on how they 
should act. Their behaviour is non-cooperative when they make decisions unilaterally; 
maximizing their own payoffs conditional on an expectation of how the others will act 
(Perman et al., 2011, ch. 9). According to Perman et al. (2011, p. 285) "[a] widely accepted 
tenet of non-cooperative game theory is that dominant strategies are selected where they 
exist." 
The earliest studies on membership models were rooted in cooperative game theory. The 
focus in these models is on the stability of the grand coalition and the socially optimal level 
of abatement. This can be interpreted as the situation where all potential parties form a 
coalition and jointly maximize their aggregate payoffs. The agents then have to decide 
whether or not to be party to this specific treaty. The gain from cooperation is the aggregate 
payoff from cooperation that exceeds the payoff from not having the coalition. The coalition 
is stable if each member's share of the gains from cooperation is high enough, so that they 
will not profit from not being members of the coalition. Side payments (see definition below) 
may be used to further induce participation. These models focus solely on first-best outcomes 
(the socially optimal outcome), and are not able to explain the sub-optimal treaties we see in 
real life. 
Other studies on membership models also make use of non-cooperative game theory. The 
payoff structure in these models is static, meaning that there is only one time period (in which 
decisions are made simultaneously and the final outcome is determined). An individual payoff 
                                                                
5 These will be further explained below. 
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is assigned to every agent for every possible coalition. Each coalition is assumed to maximize 
aggregate payoff conditional on actual number of members. Non-members maximize their 
own individual payoffs. Agents "cooperate with their coalition but behave non-cooperatively 
against outsiders" (Finus, 2004, p. 97). As a result, equilibrium is often a situation with lower 
than socially optimal abatement and inefficient coalition structures. The main question is: 
Which coalition structure can be sustained as an equilibrium? The concepts internal and 
external stability are central to answering this question. 
A coalition is internally stable if no member is better off by no longer being a member and 
externally stable if no non-member is better off by becoming a member. Deviation, which in 
this framework means to be a non-member, is tempting to individual agents if it is profitable. 
When a member leaves the coalition, the remaining members re-optimize their aggregated 
payoff, conditional on the remaining number of members. The 'punishment' for leaving is then 
that the remaining coalition members increase their emissions somewhat. Leaving a coalition 
is profitable if the private gain from leaving exceeds the private damage from the increased 
emissions resulting from the coalition increasing their emissions. When a new member joins a 
coalition the reverse happens: The coalition members re-optimize their aggregated payoff 
(and decrease their emissions). Joining a coalition is profitable if the resulting decrease in 
damages is larger than the cost of abating. 
When there are many potential parties and only the total abatement matters, the contribution 
of one state matters little in the aggregate. When many states are involved and the 
environmental damages are high compared to the benefits of emissions, the gains of 
cooperation are high (Finus, 2004). But this is also when the incentive to free-ride is large 
(Barrett, 2003, ch. 13). Thus; cooperation is harder to sustain the greater the need for 
cooperation is (Barrett, 2003, ch. 7). The main result is that for homogeneous agents, only 
small coalitions are stable, and for heterogeneous agents (without side payments) the 
coalitions accomplish even less in terms of emission reduction (Finus, 2004).  
Pavlova and de Zeeuw (2012) look at coalitions when there are two types of countries; one 
type with higher benefits of emissions and lower damages than the other. Their conclusion is 
that while asymmetries among states allow for much larger coalitions in terms of members; 
total emission reductions are actually lower in these large coalitions than in small coalitions 
among only the countries with low benefits of emissions and high damages. 
14 
 
A coalition is potentially internally stable if the gains of cooperation are large enough to, with 
the use of side payments, compensate the members so that no member becomes better off by 
no longer being a member (Holtsmark, 2013). Side payment can be seen as incentive payment 
to make an agent agree to doing something it would not otherwise do, they can be helpful in 
sustaining cooperation and in supporting a fair outcome (Barrett, 2003, ch. 13). The payments 
can be made either in cash or in kind 
6
 (Finus, 2004) and the promise of side payments has to 
be credible. Side payments are only helpful when the agents are heterogeneous (not equal).
7
 
When there are strong asymmetries (differences) among the players, side payments are able to 
sustain a vastly superior outcome compared to the situation without side payments (Barrett, 
2003, ch. 13). On the downside, while side payments do make recipients more inclined to 
become members, they make the donors 'worse off' by lowering their payoff, making them 
less likely to want to stay members (Barrett, 2003, ch. 13).   
The models using non-cooperative game theory are able to look at several possible coalitions, 
not only the socially optimal one. Still, they are limited to looking at only one coalition at a 
time, and are not able to evaluate a situation where there exist multiple coalitions at once. 
This subject is investigated in the sub-group of membership models Finus names 'new 
coalition theory' (see Finus, 2004, p. 120).  
Compliance models are the second type of IEA models (the following synopsis is based 
entirely on Finus (2004)). These models take membership as given. Free-riding in this context 
is to be a member of a treaty but not comply with the agreed abatement. Compliance "is only 
interesting in a non-cooperative game theoretical setting where there is a time lag between 
violation and discovery through other participants" (Finus, 2004, p. 125). The outcome is 
stable if incentives to free-ride are deterred by threats to punish deviations. Sanctions often 
have a negative effect also on those carrying out the punishment, and the coordination of 
sanctions between the remaining members may be costly and time-consuming, making it hard 
to see the threat of punishment as credible. For more information on compliance models, see 
Finus (2004, p. 125). 
                                                                
6 In kind payments take the form of a gift of commodities rather than cash (Handmark, Inc., 2011) 
7 See Barrett (2003, ch. 13.2) for an explanation of why it does not make sense to look at side payments for homogeneous (identical) 
countries. 
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3 The model 
In this chapter I present the model I will use in the rest of this thesis, using my own 
calculations. It is a model of international negotiation on the reduction of greenhouse gases. 
The motivation for looking at this model is found in Holtsmark (2013) and has been discussed 
in the introduction to the thesis (chapter 1). Scott Barrett (2003, ch. 7 & 13) describes a 
similar negotiation model.
8
 
Emissions of CO2 and other climate gases harm the atmosphere. The damages from pollution 
depend on the stock of pollutants. Emissions only matter in so far as they add to the existing 
stock. The emission of greenhouse gases is an example of uniformly mixing pollution. The 
location of emissions does not matter; an increase in the stock of pollutants only depends on 
total emissions.  
In my model there is no distinction between the accumulation of and the emission of 
pollution. That is because the model is static; all decisions are made within one time period. 
The model does not consider changes in the stock of pollution over time.  
The model I will use belongs to the group of models Finus (2004) calls membership models. 
The payoff function is the linear benefit/quadratic cost function found in Barrett (2006, p. 22): 
        
 
    
  
 
 
 
                                        (3.1) 
There are N countries, πi is country i’s payoff and qi is country i’s abatement.       
 
    is 
country i's benefit from abatement and  
  
 
 
 
  is country i's cost of abatement. It is clear from 
this equation that while a country’s benefit depends on the sum of all abatement (global 
abatement level), its cost depends only on the abatement in country i. 
The benefit of abatement can be interpreted as damages avoided when emissions are reduced. 
I assume, for simplicity, that the damages avoided are (and can be precisely) measured in a 
monetary unit. If the benefit parameter, bi, is positive, emissions are harmful for country i. 
The cost of abatement is simply the cost of reducing emissions (see discussion in chapter 2.1), 
measured in a monetary unit. I assume that the cost parameter, ci, is strictly positive. In other 
words, I assume that abatement has a positive cost for country i.  
                                                                
8 Barrett uses a linear payoff function in this book. 
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Supplying abatement is privately profitable for country i as long as the total cost of abatement 
for the country is lower than the country's total benefit from that abatement. The abatement of 
country i is collectively profitable as long as the total cost of abatement for country i is lower 
than the global benefit (the sum of all individual countries' benefits) of that abatement. 
Assuming that the global benefit of abatement is larger than the individual benefit for country 
i, unilaterally determined abatement will fall short of the abatement level that is best for the 
global society. 
I assume that each country behaving unilaterally maximize its individual payoff, taking the 
other countries’ abatement as given. The privately optimal level of abatement (  
   for country 
i is found by equating i's marginal benefit and marginal cost. This is what is often referred to 
as the business as usual (BaU) level of abatement. 
   
  
     
        
              
       
    
  
                                       
  
  
  
    (3.2) 
bi is i's marginal benefit and ciqi is i's marginal cost. The marginal benefit can be interpreted 
as the increase in benefits when abatement is increased by one unit. The marginal cost is the 
increase in costs as abatement increases by one unit.  
If the marginal cost for country i is lower than the marginal benefit for country i, the increase 
in benefits more than makes up for the increase in costs for country i following an increase in 
abatement. Country i's payoff increases with abatement until the privately optimal level of 
abatement is reached. Beyond this point, i's marginal benefit is smaller than i's marginal cost, 
and a further increase in abatement reduces i’s payoff.  
The payoff function for country i can be rewritten as: 
          
   
          
  
 
  
                                    (3.3) 
The first term in equation (3.3) is strictly increasing in     , while the term in the brackets is 
decreasing in    for    
  
  
 given that bi and ci are positive. This means that the payoff 
function is increasing with respect to the abatement of others, but is decreasing in own 
abatement above and beyond the privately optimal abatement level. Each country will prefer a 
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situation where they themselves abate at the privately optimal level, while the others abate 
more.  
We can make sure that the privately optimal abatement level is the only maximum of    with 
respect to    by looking at the second order condition (Sydsæter, 2000): 
  
                   for all possible    since        
We then know that equation (3.2) is the maximum of equation (3.1), which is strictly concave 
with respect to   . The payoff function is increasing in    for      
  and decreasing in    
for      
 , confirming the statement above (Sydsæter, 2000).
 9
  
A country’s benefit depends on the abatement level in the other countries. Assuming that 
global welfare is given by the sum of the individual countries' payoff, the socially optimal 
level of abatement (  
  ) is found by maximizing the global payoff (the sum of the all 
individual countries' payoff):  
            
 
       
 
      
 
     
  
 
  
  
     
        
     (3.4) 
                                               
   
   
 
   
  
    (3.5) 
Since the sum of strictly concave functions is a strictly concave function (Sydsæter, 2000), it 
follows that (3.5) is the maximum. It also follows that global payoff increases in    for 
     
   and decreases in    for      
  . 
To arrive at the socially optimal solution, there must exist some mechanism by which each 
country is forced to take the global benefit of one unit of abatement into account. It is obvious 
that as long as the sum of all individual benefits (   
 
   ) is positive, the socially optimal 
level of abatement is larger than the privately optimal level of abatement.
10
 As long as 
countries act unilaterally, emission reductions will be below the social optimum. 
                                                                
9   
        for      
  and   
        for      
  where   
  is a global maximum point (Sydsæter, 2000) 
10   
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3.1 Two identical countries 
In this section I will present the model assuming there are only two, identical countries. 
Abatement in country 1 is   , abatement in country 2 is   , making global abatement      . 
Assume also that    is an integer from 0 to 3. The payoff for each country has the linear 
benefit/quadratic cost structure described above. Since the countries are identical they have 
the same costs and benefits. The value of the parameters b and c does not matter for this 
analysis, so I will follow Holtsmark (2013) and assume that b = c = 1. The payoffs for the two 
countries are then: 
           
 
 
  
                 
The different payoffs corresponding to different abatement levels are presented in table 1. 
Each cell shows the payoff of each country for given values of    and   . The first number in 
each cell is country 1’s payoff and the second is country 2’s payoff. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The BaU level of abatement (see eq. (3.2)) is    
   . This is the abatement each would 
choose if they act unilaterally. The socially optimal level of abatement is   
     (see eq. 
(3.5). This is the abatement they would choose if they cooperate – where the global payoff is 
maximized.  
 Country 2 
  q2 = 0 q2 = 1 q2 = 2 q2 = 3 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 1
 
q1 = 0 0 0 1 0,5 2 0 3 -1,5 
q1 = 1 0,5 1 1,5 1,5 2,5 1 3,5 -0,5 
q1 = 2 0 2 1 2,5 2 2 3 0,5 
q1 = 3 -1,5 3 -0,5 3,5 0,5 3 1,5 1,5 
  Table 3.1 – An abatement game between two countries 
Source: Holtsmark (2013) 
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The choice, for each country, between 1 and 2 units of abatement is a classic Prisoners' 
Dilemma.
11
 Abatement below the BaU level will never be chosen, since each country's payoff 
is increasing with respect to its own abatement below this point, making it profitable to 
increase abatement. Total payoff is increasing with country i’s abatement until the socially 
optimal level of abatement is reached, then decreases with further abatement in country i. 
Abatement above the socially optimal level will not be chosen if the countries are able to 
cooperate. 
Both countries could do no better than to stick with the BaU level of abatement, regardless of 
what the other country does, hence the BaU abatement level is a Nash equilibrium. It is, 
however, not Pareto efficient. It is possible to make both countries better off if both choose 
the socially optimal level of abatement. Unfortunately, the BaU level of abatement is their 
dominant strategy. It is clear from table 3.1 that no matter what the other country does, both 
countries can do no better than to choose the BaU level of abatement. If they make an 
agreement to choose the socially optimal abatement level, both countries would want to 
deviate and choose the BaU level of abatement instead. To reach the socially optimal 
outcome, the countries must be able to negotiate and commit to an agreement. Since there is 
no mechanism to enforce international cooperation, such an agreement has to be self-
enforcing. It has to change incentives so as to make it desirable not to deviate from the social 
optimum.  An agreement between several countries is described in the next section. 
3.2 16 individual countries 
Now, assume that we have N = 16 identical countries with the payoff structure defined in 
section 3.1, where b = c = 1: 
      
  
    
 
 
  
                      (3.6) 
From equation (3.2) I find that the BaU level of abatement is   
   , giving each country a 
payoff of 15.5.
12
 This is the level of abatement each country will choose if they make 
decisions unilaterally. Global payoff is then 248.  The socially optimal level of abatement is 
                                                                
11 The inner part of table (3.1) is in fact the mirror image of table (2.1) from chapter 2. 
12 Assuming that all 16 countries abate at the BaU level and inserting this into equation (3.5). 
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found by using equation (3.5);    
   
   
  
   . Assuming that all countries abate at the 
socially optimal level, each country then receives a payoff of 128, making the global payoff 
2048. This is clearly a much better solution for everyone. Unfortunately, the payoff from 
being a free rider (enjoying high abatement from others but abating at the privately optimal 
level (BaU) themselves) is 240.5 given that the other 15 countries still abate at the socially 
optimal level. This is clearly a much better payoff than what they get from abating 16 units 
like the rest.  
We know from equation (3.3) and the subsequent discussion that qi
*
 = 1 is country i’s 
dominant strategy, because this is the abatement that maximizes country i’s payoff function, 
irrespective of other countries’ choices. In other words, no matter what the other countries do, 
it is best for country i to stick to the BaU level of abatement. Since this is true for all 
countries, the only Nash equilibrium is the outcome where every country abates only 1 unit 
each.  
To arrive at a collectively better result, the countries can make an agreement. Since the 
incentive to free ride is present, the agreement has to be self-enforcing. The social optimum, 
where all 16 countries cooperate and maximize their joint payoff is, as we already know from 
the discussion above, not a stable solution. The incentive to free ride is too large.  
Keeping in mind that global payoff increases with country i's abatement as long as      
  , it 
would be interesting to see if some sort of agreement could lead to a stable outcome that is 
better than the BaU solution. Assuming that countries behave cooperatively towards other 
members if they are part of an agreement and non-cooperatively towards those who are not 
makes this a non-cooperative membership model (Finus, 2004). Coalition members maximize 
their joint payoff, taking the behaviour of non-members as given. Non-members make 
unilateral decisions, maximizing their own payoff. 
This can be seen as a three stage game (Barrett, 2003, ch. 7), where the countries at stage 1 
decide whether or not to be part of an agreement. k is then the number of members in an 
agreement.
13
  In stage 2 the coalition members chose their abatement level, taking the number 
of members and non-members as given, while in stage 3 the non-members unilaterally choose 
their own abatement level, also taking the number of members and non-members as given. 
                                                                
13 k is an integer from 1 to 16. 
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Since the payoff structure is common knowledge, all countries know the abatement levels and 
payoffs that follow from every possible coalition size. It therefore makes sense to begin by 
looking at stage 3 first, then at stage 2 and finally at stage 1, taking the resulting abatement 
levels as given. 
We already know that the BaU abatement level will be chosen by countries acting 
unilaterally. It does not matter how large the coalition is; although the payoff for non-
members is increasing in k it is always best to abate only 1 unit. Thus, the non-members will 
choose   
    no matter what. 
In stage 2 the coalition members decide which abatement level will be chosen for every 
coalition size. They maximize their joint payoff, taking the emission of non-members as 
given. The optimal abatement for each coalition member is   
   .14  
Table 3.2 depicts the payoff for each member (πm(k)) and non-member (πn(k)) of every 
possible coalition size (k):
 15
 
k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
  (k) - 16 17,5 20 23,5 28 33,5 40 47,5 56 65,5 76 87,5 100 113,5 128 
  (k) 15,5 17,5 21,5 27,5 35,5 45,5 57,5 71,5 87,5 105,5 125,5 147,5 171,5 197,5 225,5 - 
Global 
payoff 
248 277 332 410 508 623 752 892 1040 1193 1348 1502 1652 1795 1928 2048 
Global 
abatement 
16 18 22 28 36 46 58 72 88 106 126 148 172 198 226 256 
Table 3.2 – The payoff for members (m) and non-members (n) and global payoff and abatement 
when there is a coalition with k members 
 
See footnote 14 and 15 for calculation of    (k) and   (k). Global payoff is the sum of the payoff for members and non-members. Global abatement is 
the sum of abatement for members and non-members. 
 
It is easy to see that non-members have a greater payoff than coalition members, and that the 
payoffs increase with k. Total abatement also increases with k. This model says nothing about 
which countries cooperate and which do not. The exact identity of members and non-
members is irrelevant to the total payoff and total abatement when the countries are identical. 
                                                                
14   
  
   
 
   
  
 
   
  
                             
15 We have that                          
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The identities are not, however, irrelevant to the individual countries themselves, since the 
countries that get to free ride have a much higher individual payoff than those who cooperate.  
All that remains is to find out how many countries will choose to become coalition members. 
The agreement must be self-enforcing in the sense that no members should be better off by 
not being members. That means that there must be internal stability. Non-members must be 
better off by staying out of the agreement, i.e. there must be external stability. In terms of the 
payoff functions, this means that: 
                                                   16                                       
                                                   17                                       
Figure 3.1 depicts the left-hand sides of the two stability equations ((3.7) and (3.8)). The 
equations are solved using the payoff calculations from table 3.2 above. 
 
 
 
The internal stability condition (eq. (3.7)) holds for k = 2 and k = 3 and does not hold for 
k > 3. (Eq. (3.7) is not relevant for k < 2). This implies that the solutions k = 2 and k = 3 are 
the only internally stable solutions, see dashed line in figure 3.1.  
                                                                
16               
 
 
                     
  
 
 
17                    
  
 
 
 
 
                
Figure 3.1 – The stability of a coalition with k members 
A coalition is both internally and externally stable when both 
curves are ≥ 0. 
Source: Payoff calculations from table 3.2 
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The external stability condition (eq. (3.8)) is binding for k = 2 and holds for k > 2, but does 
not hold for k = 1. Note that when k = 1 there is no cooperation and the countries behave 
unilaterally, abating at the BaU level. We therefore see that the BaU solution is not externally 
stable. However; all other solutions – i.e. where k ≥ 2 – are externally stable.  
A coalition is both internally and externally stable only when k = 2 or k = 3.  
Although there are 16 countries and everyone has to cooperate to achieve the socially optimal 
solution, the largest coalition that is both internally and externally stable has only three 
members. Total payoff when k = 3 is 332. Although this is higher than the total payoff in BaU 
of 248, it is no way near as large as the socially optimal payoff of 2048. In terms of achieving 
higher abatement, more cooperation is better. Total abatement is only 16 units when k = 1. 
When k = 3 total abatement is slightly higher; 22 units. This is far below the socially optimal 
level of total abatement; 256 units. This rather depressing result, that we only get small 
coalitions with relatively low abatement, is a well-known result in theory of international 
climate treaties (see section 2.5). Still, total abatement is higher with cooperation than 
without. 
3.3 Heterogeneous countries 
In this section I will briefly present the model when we have 16 heterogeneous countries, 
expanding on the discussion in Holtsmark (2013).
18
 That the countries are heterogeneous 
means that they are not identical, but have their own country specific costs and benefits. That 
means they have individual values of the parameters b and c. This is, in a sense, a more 
realistic assumption, since states really are different.  
When states are different and there are no side payments, it is no longer obvious that a 
coalition will maximize its joint payoff. While the sum of payoffs is indeed maximized, some 
states may have much lower individual gains from cooperation than others. 
Many different abatement rules could be negotiated, making some countries better off and 
some countries worse off. One alternative rule is that the members of a coalition agree to 
abate the same percentage of their existing emissions. One of the main problems of 
                                                                
18 Here, Holtsmark looks at 16 heterogeneous world regions, but points out that single countries are in fact the relevant units. 
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international climate negotiations is getting all states to agree on a specific plan of action 
(Barrett, 2003). 
If we allow for side payments, it is more realistic that the coalition will choose to maximize 
its joint payoff. The total gain of cooperation is then as large as it can be, and can be divided 
among the coalition members in any way they please.  
In the following I will assume that the members of a coalition do maximize their joint payoff, 
both with and without side payments. I will first consider the situation without side payments. 
Country i's payoff function is identical to equation (3.1), with N = 16: 
        
  
    
  
 
 
 
                                         (3.9) 
The BaU level of abatement (see eq. (3.2)) for country i is    
  
  
  
. This depends only on the 
costs and benefits of country i.  We know from the discussion at the beginning of this chapter 
that this is country i's best response (the abatement level that maximizes i's individual payoff) 
no matter what the other countries do.  
The socially optimal level of abatement (see eq. (3.5)) for country i is  
 
   
   
  
   
  
. This 
depends on the costs of country i and all countries’ benefit from abatement. Because of the 
concavity of the global payoff function (eq. (3.4)) with respect to qi global payoff decreases 
with further abatement from country i, no matter what the other countries do.  
Like the case with identical countries, the BaU level of abatement is the only Nash 
equilibrium when the countries make decisions unilaterally. It is therefore interesting to see if 
some sort of cooperation (and an outcome which is better for all countries than the BaU 
solution) is self-enforcing (see section 2.5). As with the identical countries, such an agreement 
must be both internally and externally stable.  
When the countries have different payoff functions, the identity of the members and non-
members of a coalition is relevant for aggregate payoffs. There are 65 519 different 
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hypothetical coalitions with at least two members when we look at coalitions between 16 
heterogeneous countries.
 19
  
Let K denote any possible coalition and M be the set of countries that are members of 
coalition K. The members of coalition K maximize their joint payoff with respect to qi.   
  is 
then the abatement level for member i of coalition K: 
 
   
  
   
   
     
   
     
   
  
  
 
  
 
    
  
        
   
                                               
  
      
  
                                                    
D is the set of non-members of coalition K. Non-members abate at the BaU level (  
  from eq. 
(3.2)). 
      is the payoff for country i provided that there exists a coalition K. Country i is a 
member of coalition K if      but is not a member of coalition K if     : 
             
 
   
      
 
   
   
 
 
       
 
 
where        
      
  
   
                
  
  
   
                     
  
Coalition K is internally and externally stable if these conditions hold: 
                                                                                       
                                                                                    
        is the payoff for member i if it withdraws from coalition K and         is the 
payoff of non-member i if it joins coalition K. 
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 With n countries there are 2
n
 possible subsets of countries, including the empty set. By subtracting the empty 
set (no countries in the coalition) and the n single-country coalitions we get 2
n
 - (n + 1) coalitions with at least 
two members. When we have 16 countries we get:                    
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The coalition is internally stable if country i’s payoff (when    ) from being a member of 
the coalition is greater than (or equal to) the payoff country i gets from being a non-member 
of coalition   ; a coalition consisting of all the members of coalition K except for country i 
itself. This must hold for all members of coalition K.  
Coalition K is externally stable if country i (when     ) gets a higher payoff from being a 
non-member of coalition K than from being a member of coalition    ; a coalition with all 
the original members of coalition K plus country i itself. This must hold for all non-members 
of coalition K. 
It is also interesting to investigate whether some sort of side payment can be made to induce 
countries to become members of a coalition they would not otherwise be members of. A 
coalition K is potentially internally stable if it can be made internally stable when side 
payments are allowed.  
                
   
                                                                   
This condition states that the sum of all members' net gains from membership must be 
positive. Thus, coalition K is potentially internally stable even if country i’s internal stability 
condition does not hold, as long as at least one other member of the coalition gains enough 
from being part of the coalition to make up for i’s loss. The countries that gain can make side 
payments to the countries that lose to entice them to be members of the coalition.  
The payoffs, abatement level and stability of the 65 519 possible coalitions depend on the 
parameter values of all the 16 countries. The parameter values will be discussed in the next 
chapter. The results of the model will then be presented and discussed in chapter 5.  
The results are obtained by using the spreadsheets developed by Holtsmark (2013). The 
spreadsheets incorporate the equations from the model for heterogeneous countries specified 
above, calculating country i’s payoff and abatement level, total payoff and abatement and the 
individual countries’ gains from participation in each possible coalition (see the left hand side 
of equation (3.11)). This allows us to analyse the internal stability and potential internal 
stability of each coalition. 
Both Holtsmark and I have checked a number of coalitions with manual calculation to 
confirm the accuracy of the spreadsheets. 
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4 The parameters 
To be able to analyse the 65 519 coalitions and check whether they are internally, externally 
and potentially internally stable I need to know the numerical values of bi and ci for all 
countries i. The values should reflect, as precisely as possible, the real costs and benefits for 
each country. I need to find a simple, reasonable and consistent approximation of the 
parameters. 
Anything from cleaner air to the preservation of an endangered species or limiting the global 
rise in temperature to avoid damaging changes in agriculture and a rising sea level can be 
benefits from reduced green-house gas emissions. For some countries there may even be 
positive consequences of global warming, such as better conditions for agriculture due to 
increased temperatures at higher altitudes. This would translate into a negative benefit 
parameter. My interpretation of the benefit parameter (bi) 
 
is that it is country i’s marginal 
willingness to pay for one unit of reduction in emissions, i.e. one unit of abatement. 
The cost of abatement depends on what kind of technology a country uses, how energy 
efficient they are, how essential the polluting technology is to the country’s economy, etc. I 
assume that the countries abate where abatement is cheapest first, making an extra unit of 
abatement cheaper if the current level of abatement is low. This is consistent with an 
increasing cost function ( 
  
 
  
  from eq. (3.1) is increasing when ci,qi > 0). The cost parameter 
(ci) is also a purely monetary measure.  
4.1 Regional parameters 
Collecting all the data necessary to produce realistic estimations of the parameters is a time-
consuming process. Luckily, others have developed and used methods to calculate these 
parameters. One such method is presented by Osmani and Tol (2009). They use version 2.8 of 
the integrated assessment model Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and 
Distribution (FUND) to estimate the parameters in a linear benefit/quadratic cost structure 
(Osmani & Tol, 2009) similar to the one I use in this thesis.  
FUND is a huge and complicated model that takes everything from economic and 
demographical factors to a vide range of other consequences of global warming into 
consideration (Tol, 2006). A detailed description of the FUND model estimations are beyond 
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the scope of this thesis, and I will therefore take the parameters presented by Osmani and Tol 
as given in the following chapters. 
The payoff function I use is slightly different from the payoff function presented by Osmani 
and Tol (2009). I therefore need to revise the parameter estimations presented in their paper. 
This is inspired by Holtsmark (2013).  
Osmani and Tol’s payoff function with n=16 heterogeneous regions with subscript i, is: 
          
 
 
     
   
 
Here βi is the marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions (in dollars per tonne of 
carbon), αi is the abatement cost parameter (unitless), Ri is the relative emission reduction, Ei 
is unabated carbon dioxide emissions (in billion metric tonnes of carbon) and Yi is gross 
domestic product (in billions US dollars). The 16 regions and the corresponding parameter 
estimations are presented in table 4.1, together with data on Ei and Yi. 
  αi βi Ei Yi 
USA 0.01515466 2.19648488 1.647 10399 
Canada 0.01516751 0.093156 0.124 807 
Western Europe 0.01568 3.15719404 0.762 12575 
Japan and South Korea 0.0156278 -1.42089104 0.525 8528 
Australia and New Zealand 0.0151065 -0.05143806 0.079 446 
Central and Eastern Europe 0.01465218 0.10131831 0.177 407 
Former Soviet Union 0.01381774 1.27242378 0.811 629 
Middle East 0.01434659 0.04737632 0.424 614 
Central America 0.01486421 0.06652486 0.115 388 
South America 0.015137 0.26839935 0.223 1351 
South Asia 0.01436564 0.35566631 0.559 831 
Southeast Asia 0.01484894 0.73159104 0.334 1094 
China plus 0.01444354 4.35686225 1.431 2376 
North Africa 0.01459959 0.96627119 0.101 213 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.01459184 1.07375825 0.145 302 
Small Island States 0.01434621 0.05549814 0.038 55 
Table 4.1 – The FUND model 
Source: Osmani & Tol (2009, p. 461) 
   
 
 
To avoid confusing the regions in Osmani and Tol's paper with my 16 individual countries, I 
will from now on index regions (r) with superscript and countries (i) with subscript.  
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Abatement (q
r
) can be defined as emissions with no abatement (E
r
) minus actual emissions 
(which I call Ωr). Ωr can also be written as (1 – Rr)Er, where Rr is relative emission reduction, 
       and Er is unabated emissions. We can then define qr (the variable in my payoff 
function) in terms of R
r
 and E
r
 (variables in Osmani and Tol’s payoff function) as qr = RrEr  
(Holtsmark, 2013).
20
 
b
r
 is the benefit parameter for region r in the payoff function I use in this thesis. b
r
 can be 
derived from βr; the benefit parameter in Osmani and Tol's payoff function: 
           
             
          
               
βr is, according to Osmani and Tol (2009), the marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide 
emissions (in dollars per tonne of carbon), so b
r
 should then also be interpreted as the 
marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions for region r. 
 
                                                                
20 qr= Er– Ωr= Er – (1 – Rr)Er = RrEr 
Region r Population CO2 emissions  b
r cr 
USA 295 516 599 5 595 358 2.1965 116.19 
Canada 32 312 000 562 796 0.0932 1592.12 
Western Europe 402 671 727 3 390 758 3.1572 679.16 
Japan and South Korea 175 911 000 1 701 107 -1.4209 967.07 
Australia and New Zealand 24 528 700 400 763 -0.0514 2159.11 
Central and Eastern Europe 108 652 994 744 885 0.1013 380.70 
Former Soviet Union 279 020 948 2 431 749 1.2724 26.43 
Middle East 258 924 895 1 643 744 0.0474 98.00 
Central America 145 394 537 476 149 0.0665 872.18 
South America 314 701 356 793 495 0.2684 822.46 
South Asia 1 516 964 984 1 601 676 0.3557 76.41 
Southeast Asia 565 208 630 1 059 961 0.7316 291.24 
China plus 1 337 307 870 5 924 688 4.3569 33.52  
North Africa 153 282 846 399 487 0.9663 609.69 
Sub-Saharan Africa 740 545 039 640 478 1.0738 419.19 
Small Island States 44 329 527 106 526 0.0555 1092.86 
Table 4.2 – Region r’s total population and emissions, and the recalculated 
region parameters. 
 
Total population in region r is the sum of the population in each individual country within region r. 
Total emissions in region r are the sum of the emissions in each individual country within region r. 
See table (4.3) below for a list of the countries belonging to each region. 
 
Source: Population data: World Bank (2005b), emission data: World Bank (2005a), benefit parameter bi and cost parameter ci: Holtsmark (2013) 
based on Osmani &Tol (2009) 
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The cost parameter for region r (c
r
) corresponding to the payoff function in this thesis (eq. 
(3.9)) can also be calculated from Osmani and Tol's payoff function (where αr is the cost 
parameter for region r). Keeping in mind that q
r
 = R
r
E
r
, q
r
 is abatement in eq. (3.9), R
r
 is 
defined by Osmani and Tol as relative emission reduction, E
r
 as unabated carbon dioxide 
emissions and Y
r
 as gross domestic product (in billions US dollars), we can calculate c
r
 
(Holtsmark, 2013): 
  
 
                       
           
                   
 
    
  
The results of these calculations are presented in table 4.2 above, together with population and 
emissions data for the 16 regions. 
4.2 The parameters of country i 
Holtsmark (2013, p. 338) shows that aggregation of countries is only appropriate as long as 
the aggregated units actually act as a union. Otherwise such aggregations can give misleading 
results. The relevant parties to an international climate treaty are independent states, not 
regions consisting of several states (see section 2.3).  
Osmani and Tol estimated the payoff functions of      world regions (r) (2009). I want to 
find the parameters corresponding to      independent countries (i). I have chosen to use 
the 16 countries with the highest emission of CO2 in 2005 (World Bank, 2005a). 
I make the simplifying approximation that all individuals within region r experience the same 
consequences of global warming because of similarities in natural resources, climate and 
other geographical aspects within the region. If there are cultural similarities, local 
preferences are similar within region r, and the individuals within the region have similar 
incomes, they may also value the damages avoided by abatement the same way. With these 
assumptions, it is reasonable to assume that every single individual within region r have the 
same, identical marginal benefit from abatement, which I label    .  
Finally I assume that p
r
 is the total population in region r and that the region benefit parameter 
is simply the sum of the benefit parameters of every individual within region r: 
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  is the total population in country i within region r. Since I have assumed that the region’s 
benefit parameter is the sum of the region population’s individual benefit parameters, country 
i’s benefit parameter is the sum of the individual benefit parameters of country i’s 
population: 21 
                                             
              
         
            
  
 
  
                                            
This formula is later used for the calibration of country-specific benefit parameters. 
Let’s now assume that each country i within region r has their own individual marginal 
abatement cost function and that the region’s marginal abatement cost function is an 
aggregation of these functions.
22
 The marginal cost in region r is not the sum of the cost of 
one unit of abatement in every country, but the cost of abating one unit in one country. Thus, 
the aggregated marginal cost is not the sum of the individual marginal costs at given levels of 
abatement. 
It makes more sense to think of the aggregated marginal abatement cost as the sum of 
individual abatement decisions at a given marginal cost of abatement. The marginal cost of 
abatement corresponds to a specific level of abatement for each country i. With heterogeneous 
cost functions, a given marginal cost of abatement corresponds to a different level of 
abatement for each country. At this given marginal cost, aggregated abatement is the sum of 
these different abatement levels. I therefore use a technique called horizontal summation to 
separate country i’s abatement cost parameter from region r’s. This technique is explained 
very simply by Robert Hansen (2007).  
The marginal cost of abatement for country i is the derivative of country i’s payoff function 
(see eq. (3.9)) with respect to abatement (qi). 
            
          
         
 
  
     
Similarly, the marginal cost of abatement for region r is the derivative of region r’s payoff 
function (see eq. (3.9)) with respect to abatement (q
r
). 
                                                                
21 Where all     are identical within region r and equal to 
 
 
  
 (from eq. (4.1)) 
22 The marginal cost of abatement (MAC) for country i is      
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Since we use horizontal summation, we know that aggregated abatement (i.e. abatement in 
region r) is the sum of individual abatement decisions (i.e. abatement in country i) at a given 
marginal cost of abatement; where MACi = MAC
r
 = MAC. 
      
         
   
            
        
 
  
      
 
  
 
         
       
            
     
                                                              
 
  
    
 
  
 
         
                                                         
I further assume that production technologies are similar for all countries i within region r. 
Consider countries v and w; they are both part of region r and total emissions in country v are 
higher than total emissions in country w. Production technologies are similar; there are 
differences in total emissions either because country w abates more than country v (i.e. 
country v is less environmentally friendly) or because in country v the polluting activity is of a 
larger magnitude to begin with than in country w (i.e. country v has a larger polluting sector).  
Regardless of why emissions are higher in country v than in country w, one additional unit of 
abatement should be cheaper for country v than for country w. If the economic conditions 
within region r are similar, it is not unreasonable to assume that country v will find cheaper 
ways to reduce emission than country w, either because country v has lower total abatement 
than country w (since the marginal cost of abatement is increasing with abatement, every 
additional unit of abatement is more expensive for country v than for country w)
23
 or because 
country w has a smaller polluting sector than country v, and might be harder pressed to reduce 
emissions simply because it has lower emissions.  
In terms of the model, this means that country w’s marginal cost of abatement should be 
higher than country v’s marginal cost of abatement. The marginal abatement cost for country i 
depends on country i’s cost parameter (ci) and abatement in country i (qi); a higher marginal 
cost of abatement could either come from a higher cost parameter or a higher level of 
abatement.  
                                                                
23 The marginal cost of abatement (MACi = ciqi) is increasing in abatement because the derivative of the marginal cost is positive: 
    
        if ci > 0  
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If the difference between total emissions in country v and w stem only from differences in 
abatement and the two countries have equally large polluting activities, then the marginal cost 
in country w is higher than the marginal cost in country v simply because qv is lower than qw. 
But if the countries have identical technology, similar economies and the same magnitude of 
polluting activities, their cost of abatement should be identical for every given level of 
abatement, implying that cv = cw. 
If country w’s polluting activity is smaller than country v’s, country w should have a higher 
marginal cost of abatement than country v for every given level of abatement. Since country 
i’s marginal cost of abatement depends only on country i’s cost parameter (ci) and abatement 
in country i (qi), this implies that country w should have a higher cost parameter than country 
v. 
This means that the relative size of country i’s polluting activity is what determines the value 
of country i’s cost parameter relative to the cost parameter in region r, given that production 
technologies and economic conditions are similar within region r.  
I have considered two methods to determine the relative size of country i’s polluting activity 
when country i is a part of region r. Both methods are very simple. 
I first define    as country i’s proportion of region r's total emissions.
24
 I then assume that    
can be interpreted as the size of country i’s polluting activity relative to the total polluting 
activity in region r. The problem with this interpretation is that country i can have relatively 
low emissions and still have a relatively high level of polluting activities – because it can have 
a high level of abatement already. This method will thus tend to give too much weight to 
countries that are lax (relative to the others within the same region) when it comes to 
abatement, which gives these countries a lower cost parameter than they should have. 
The second approach is to define    as country i’s proportion of region r's GDP,
25
 and then 
interpret    as the size of country i’s polluting activity relative to the total polluting activity in 
region r. The problem with this interpretation is that country i can have a relatively high GDP 
and still have a relatively low level of polluting activities – because relatively large parts of i’s 
                                                                
24    
                      
                      
  so that                 –   data on emissions is found at the World Bank (2005a) 
25    
              
              
  so that                 –   data on GDP is found at the World Bank (2005c) 
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national income may come from non-polluting activities. This method will thus tend to give 
too little weight to countries that get most of their income from polluting activities (relative to 
those that are more ‘environmentally friendly’), which gives these countries a higher cost 
parameter than they should have. 
If I assume that all countries behave according to the model, we know from the discussion in 
previous sections that countries abate very little when they make decisions unilaterally.
26
 
Thus, there should be no large differences in existing abatement level and therefore no large 
errors when using relative emissions as the measure of the relative size of country i’s 
polluting activity.  
It is not possible to tell from the model whether countries within region r should have equally 
polluting income-generating production or not. The errors from using GDP as the measure of 
the relative size of country i’s polluting activity could therefore be substantial.  
I therefore conclude that    is my preferred measure for determining the relative size of 
country i’s polluting activity when country i is a part of region r. 
We know that 
 
  
    
 
  
           and that    is the relative size of country i’s polluting activity. 
The inverse of country i’s abatement cost parameter  
 
  
) is the portion    of the inverse of 
region r’s cost parameter  
 
  
  27 Country i’s abatement cost parameter can then be expressed 
in terms of region r’s cost parameter (cr) and   : 
                                                                
 
  
                                                                
4.3 The value of the parameters bi and ci 
I have presented the theoretical and methodological foundation for my calculations of the 
specific parameters for each country i. I will now put the method to use and calculate the 
values of the parameters for all 16 countries.  
                                                                
26 The exact level of abatement for country i will of course depend on country i’s cost and benefit parameters. 
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Table 4.3 presents all the countries belonging to each region. The 16 countries (including the 
EU) with the highest total emission of CO2 in 2005 (the World Bank, 2005a) are chosen as the 
parties in the international climate treatise model. The EU is treated as a single player in this 
model because, as I mentioned in chapter 1, the European Union can make decisions that are 
binding for its member states and they negotiate internationally as a single unit. While my 
data is from 2005 and Bulgaria and Romania did not become members of the union until 
2007, they are still included as members of the union. The data on population and emission 
from 2005 is only used to derive each country i’s individual parameters from region r’s 
parameters. I have found the cost and benefit parameters for each member of the EU based on 
data from 2005. The parameters for the European Union are then found by aggregating its 
members’ parameters. 
These 16 countries belong to 14 of the 16 world regions in the FUND model. Most countries 
within Western Europe and some in both Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet 
Union are countries that belong to the European Union. Both the US and Canada are the only 
REGION COUNTRY 
USA United States of America 
Canada Canada 
Western Europe 
 
Andorra, Austria*, Belgium*, Cyprus*, Denmark*, Finland*, France*, Germany*, Greece*, Iceland, 
Ireland*, Italy*, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg*, Malta*, Monaco, Netherlands*, Norway, Portugal*, 
San Marino, Spain*, Sweden*, Switzerland, United Kingdom* 
Japan and South Korea Japan, South Korea 
Australia and New Zealand Australia, New Zealand 
Central and Eastern Europe 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria*, Croatia, Czech Republic*, Hungary*, FYR Macedonia, 
Poland*, Romania*, Slovak Republic*, Slovenia*, Yugoslavia 
Former Soviet Union 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia*, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia*, Lithuania*, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan 
Middle East 
Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, 
United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, Yemen 
Central America Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama 
South America 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, French Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, 
Venezuela 
South Asia Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka 
Southeast Asia 
Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam 
China plus China, Hong Kong, North Korea, Macau, Mongolia 
North Africa Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Western Sahara 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea- Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Small Island States 
 
Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Comoros, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Fiji, French Polynesia, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Haiti, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall 
Islands, Martinique, Mauritius, Micronesia, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, Palau, 
Puerto Rico, Reunion, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, St Kitts and 
Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and Grenadines, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Virgin 
Islands 
Table 4.3 – List of countries within the 16 regions in FUND 
Countries marked in bold are the 16 individual countries, including members of the European Union  
* Members of the European Union 
Source: (TABLES, 2006) 
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countries in their respective region, while Japan, South Korea, Australia and China are part of 
quite uniform regions with few other countries. Only South Africa belongs to a region with a 
very large number of other countries. The two regions to which none of the relevant countries 
belong are North Africa and the Small Island States.  
Looking at the regions in table 4.3, there are obviously differences between some countries 
within the same region. South Africa is unique when it comes to income, culture, industry, 
etc., among the South African countries. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia differ from the other 
Former Soviet Union countries and Iran and Saudi Arabia have both economic and cultural 
differences.  
Still, keeping in mind that the calculations in this thesis are simply an interesting first 
approach to the problem of deriving the benefit and cost parameters for individual countries, it 
does not seem unreasonable to assume that the people within each of the 14 relevant regions 
have equal individual benefit parameters. Within each region the conditions, both 
economically, culturally and geographically, are sufficiently similar for me to calculate 
country i’s benefit parameter (bi) using eq. (4.2) in this thesis.  
So, to find the benefit parameters (bi) for each of the individual countries, I have to use the 
region parameters    and the population size for the 16 regions (r) and the 16 independent 
countries (i). The population data for the regions are found in table 4.2 above, while the data 
for the individual countries will be presented in table 4.4. 
I have argued that relative emissions can be used to determine the size of a country's polluting 
activity relative to that of the region's. While real countries do not behave according to any 
theoretical model, I still think that differences in abatement level within each region are small 
enough to justify using relative emissions as an approximation for relative size of polluting 
activities – at least for the purposes of this thesis. I will therefore use equation (4.4) to 
calculate country i's abatement cost parameter. 
To find the cost parameters, I have to use the region cost parameters    , total emission in the 
regions (r) and emissions in the 16 independent countries (i).
28
 The results are presented in 
table 4.4 below.  
                                                                
28 Total emission in region r is found by adding the emissions in each country within the region.  
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As we can see from this table, China, the US and the EU are by far the countries that have the 
highest marginal willingness to pay for abatement. They also have relatively low cost 
parameters. Japan, the Republic of Korea and Australia on the other hand, actually have a 
negative marginal willingness to pay for abatement (i.e. they are willing to pay for higher 
emissions). The benefit parameters are negative because the benefit parameters for their 
respective regions are negative in the FUND model (see table 4.1). These three countries also 
have high cost parameters. 
Country i Region r 
 
Population 
CO2 
emissions  
bi ci xi 
China China plus   1 303 720 000 5 790 017 4.2475 34.30 0.9773 
United States of America USA   295 516 599 5 595 358 2.1965 116.19 1 
EU 
  
492 447 439 4 023 176 3.1799 225.48 -  
 
Western Europe Austria 8 227 829 74 385 0.0645 30 958.71 0.0219 
  
Belgium 10 478 617 107 117 0.0822 21 498.67 0.0316 
  
Cyprus 1 032 562 7 503 0.0081 306 939.16 0.0022 
  
Denmark 5 419 432 46 868 0.0425 49 135.24 0.0138 
  
Finland 5 246 096 54 605 0.0411 42 172.96 0.0161 
  
France 63 001 253 391 826 0.4940 5 877.26 0.1156 
  
Germany 82 469 422 809 597 0.6466 2 844.46 0.2388 
  
Greece 11 103 965 98 675 0.0871 23 337.82 0.0291 
  
Ireland 4 159 914 43 212 0.0326 53 292.39 0.0127 
  
Italy 58 607 043 471 400 0.4595 4 885.16 0.1390 
  
Luxembourg 465 158 11 327 0.0036 203 301.24 0.0033 
  
Malta 403 837 2 699 0.0032 853 257.50 0.0008 
  
Netherlands 16 319 868 172 228 0.1280 13 371.04 0.0508 
  
Portugal 10 549 424 65 309 0.0827 35 260.95 0.0193 
  
Spain 43 398 143 353 462 0.3403 6 515.17 0.1042 
  
Sweden 9 029 572 51 551 0.0708 44 671.90 0.0152 
  
United Kingdom 60 224 307 542 474 0.4722 4 245.12 0.1600 
 
Central and Eastern Europe Bulgaria 7 739 900 47 909 0.0072 5 919.05 0.0643 
  
Czech Republic 10 235 828 120 736 0.0095 2 348.74 0.1621 
  
Hungary 10 087 065 57 880 0.0094 4 899.41 0.0777 
  
Poland 38 165 445 303 767 0.0356 933.54 0.4078 
  
Romania 21 634 371 94 961 0.0202 2 986.27 0.1275 
  
Slovak Republic 5 387 001 39 175 0.0050 7 238.82 0.0526 
  
Slovenia 2 000 474 15 871 0.0019 17 867.92 0.0213 
 
Former Soviet Union Estonia 1 346 097 17 462 0.0061 3 680.57 0.0072 
  
Latvia 2 300 512 7 176 0.0105 8 956.00 0.0030 
  
Lithuania 3 414 304 14 001 0.0156 4 590.60 0.0058 
Russian Federation Former Soviet Union   143 150 000 1 615 684 0.6528 39.78 0.6644 
India South Asia   1 140 042 863 1 411 128 0.2673 86.73 0.8810 
Japan Japan and South Korea   127 773 000 1 238 188 -1.0321 1 328.63 0.7279 
Canada Canada   32 312 000 562 796 0.0932 1 592.12 1 
Korea, Rep. Japan and South Korea   48 138 000 462 918 -0.3888 3 553.73 0.2721 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Middle East   69 732 007 458 866 0.0128 351.05 0.2792 
Mexico Central America   106 483 757 432 666 0.0487 959.83 0.9087 
South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa   47 198 469 408 199 0.0684 657.72 0.6373 
Australia Australia and New Zealand   20 394 800 367 393 -0.0427 2 355.22 0.9167 
Saudi Arabia Middle East 
 
24 041 116 367 034 0.0044 438.89 0.2233 
Brazil South America  185 986 964 349 967 0.1586 1 864.80 0.4410 
Ukraine Former Soviet Union 
 
47 105 150 339 029 0.2148 189.57 0.1394 
Indonesia Southeast Asia   227 303 175 336 312 0.2942 917.91 0.3173 
Table 4.4 – Population, emissions, relative emissions and parameter values for country i. 
CO2 emissions measured in (kt), bi is a benefit parameter, ci is a cost parameter and xi is emissions in country i relative to emissions in region r (see table (4.2)). 
 
The population, emission and parameters for the EU is found by first calculating the values for all the individual member countries (relative to the region they belong to), then 
adding them together to find the aggregated values for the EU as a whole. The cost parameter for EU was aggregated using horizontal summation (see sec. 4.2). 
 
Source: Population data (World Bank, 2005b), emission data (World Bank, 2005a), the benefit parameters bi and cost parameters ci are calculated from  region parameters found in 
(Osmani & Tol, 2009) and (Holtsmark, 2013) 
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5 Numerical results 
When I solve the international negotiation model for 16 heterogeneous countries applying my 
own parameters (see table 4.4) to Holtsmark’s spreadsheets (2013), I get 65 519 possible 
coalitions with at least two members. In addition, I have to consider the privately optimal 
outcome where no countries cooperate. 
In the following I will consider a world consisting only of the following 16 countries; China, 
the United States of America, the European Union, the Russian Federation, India, Japan, 
Canada, the Republic of Korea, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mexico, South Africa, Australia, 
Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Ukraine and Indonesia. When I use terms such as global and socially 
optimal I refer to this rather limited world. While this model in no way represents the real 
world, these results might give some useful insights none the less. 
A coalition is internally stable if no single member profits from withdrawing from the 
coalition (see discussion of internal stability in section 2.5 and chapter 3). In other words, 
equation (3.11) must hold for each of the 16 individual countries. Of the 65 519 possible 
coalitions only 517 are internally stable. The non-cooperative outcome is also internally stable 
according to Holtsmark’s spreadsheets; making a total of 518 internally stable outcomes. This 
is only 0.8% of all possible outcomes. 
Internal stability is in fact a subcategory of potential internal stability; all coalitions that are 
internally stable are also potentially internally stable. To be potentially internally stable, the 
sum of the net gain of membership for all members must be positive (see discussion of 
potential internal stability in section 2.5 and chapter 3). In other words, equation (3.13) must 
hold. This condition ensures that the countries that gain from being part of the coalition 
without side payments can make side payments to countries that do not gain from 
participation without side payments and entice them to be part of the coalition. There are in 
total 53 796 potentially internally stable outcomes; 99% of them are not internally stable 
without side payments.  
The overwhelming majority – 82% – of all possible coalitions are potentially internally stable. 
This leaves us with a total of 11 724 coalitions that are not potentially internally stable.  
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When there is no cooperation, each country abates at the privately optimal level of abatement, 
called the BaU level of abatement or the non-cooperative abatement level. This level,   
 , is 
found by solving eq. (3.2) for each of the 16 countries. 
There is one coalition that includes all 16 countries as members. This grand coalition gives 
the socially optimal level of abatement,   
  , which is found by solving eq. (3.5) for each of 
the 16 countries.  
  
BaU Social optimum 
  
Payoff   
  Payoff   
   
 
GLOBAL 1.45539649 0.17722837 4.75374916 0.95308205 
1 China 0.48978122 0.12383428 2.59757376 0.29083478 
2 United States 0.36852038 0.01890438 1.66521857 0.08585532 
3 European Union 0.54114871 0.01410297 2.81005712 0.04424158 
4 Russian Federation 0.11033784 0.01641038 -0.62861509 0.2507705 
5 India 0.0469645 0.00308227 -0.31892132 0.11502107 
6 Japan -0.18331313 -0.00077680 -1.02109733 0.00750815 
7 Canada 0.01651496 0.00005854 0.05757609 0.00626556 
8 Korea, Rep. -0.06893279 -0.00010941 -0.3845868 0.00280706 
9 Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.00226217 0.00003636 -0.12956549 0.02841594 
10 Mexico 0.00863034 0.00005074 -0.00541958 0.01039296 
11 South Africa 0.01212567 0.00010405 -0.01042087 0.01516677 
12 Australia -0.00757467 -0.00001815 -0.06185793 0.0042355 
13 Saudi Arabia 0.00077997 0.00001003 -0.10917268 0.02272907 
14 Brazil 0.02810577 0.00008506 0.12449929 0.0053494 
15 Ukraine 0.03794879 0.00113312 -0.0577278 0.05262071 
16 Indonesia 0.05209677 0.00032053 0.22620922 0.01086768 
Table 5.1 – BaU and social optimum 
Abatement is measured in billion tonnes CO2 and payoff in US dollars 
Source: Holtsmark’s spreadsheets (2013), based on my own calculations reported in table (4.4) 
As we can see from table 5.1; while the socially optimal situation is superior when it comes to 
global payoff, only 6 of the 16 countries actually prefer this outcome to the BaU situation. 
The remaining 10 countries have a lower individual payoff in the socially optimal situation 
than in the non-cooperative case.   
The socially optimal situation is neither internally nor potentially internally stable. The non-
cooperative outcome, however, is defined as internally stable in Holtsmark’s spreadsheets 
(2013). This is because, even though there is no cooperation and thus no coalition, the 
countries do not gain from leaving their own private ‘coalition’ of one. 
The non-cooperative and the socially optimal outcomes are only two out of 65 520 different 
outcomes. How do the other outcomes compare to these two? In the following sections, I will 
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use two indexes to measure the relative performance of the different coalitions (Holtsmark, 
2013). These will be presented in section 5.1. 
5.1 The efficiency index and the environmental 
index 
The efficiency index is defined in equation (5.1) and measures the relative performance of 
each coalition in terms of global payoff.  
                                                                   
       
        
                                             (5.1) 
     is global payoff when there is a coalition K,        is global payoff in the non-
cooperative outcome and       is global payoff in the socially optimal outcome. The index is 
equal to zero at the value of the global payoff in the non-cooperative outcome, i.e. when there 
is no cooperation. It equals one at the value of the global payoff in socially optimal outcome, 
i.e. when there is one grand coalition including all 16 countries as members.  
The environmental index measures the performance of each coalition in terms of global 
abatement and is defined in equation (5.2).  
                                                                   
       
        
                                            (5.2) 
     is global abatement when there is a coalition K,        is global abatement in the non-
cooperative outcome and       is global abatement in the socially optimal outcome. The 
index equals zero at the level of abatement achieved in non-cooperative outcome and is equal 
to one at the level of abatement achieved in the socially optimal outcome.  
Figure 5.1 below depicts the efficiency index for each of the 65 520 possible outcomes. The 
outcomes are sorted by the number of members in each coalition (from zero to 16). The 
internally stable coalitions are marked by grey circles, the potentially internally stable 
coalitions are marked by black triangles and all other coalitions are marked by light grey 
squares. 
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Figure 5.2 below depicts the environmental index for each of the 65 520 possible outcomes. 
The outcomes are also here sorted by the number of members in a coalition. Internally stable 
coalitions are marked by grey circles and potentially internally stable coalitions are marked by 
black triangles. All other coalitions are marked by light grey squares. 
Some of the results from these figures will be presented in the next three sections and then 
discussed in section 5.5.  
Figure 5.1 – The efficiency index depending on coalition size 
The relative performance of all possible coalitions according to the efficiency index; eq. (5.1) 
Circles are internally stable coalitions, triangles are potentially internally stable coalitions and squares are the remaining coalitions 
NB: Some markers (circles, triangles or squares) are spaced so close together that they may appear to be a solid column 
Source: Holtsmark’s spreadsheets (2013), based on my own calculations reported in table (4.4) 
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Figure 5.1 – The efficiency index 
Source: Holtsmark’s spreadsheets (2013), based on my own calculations reported in table (4.4) 
Figure 5.2 – The environmental index depending on coalition size 
The relative performance of all possible coalitions according to the environmental index; eq. (5.2) 
Circles are internally stable coalitions, triangles are potentially internally stable coalitions and squares are the remaining coalitions 
NB: Some markers (circles, triangles or squares) are spaced so close together that they may appear to be a solid column 
Source: Holtsmark’s spreadsheets (2013), based on my own calculations reported in table (4.4) 
. 
5.2 Internally stable coalitions 
As we can see from figure 5.1, internally stable coalitions generally perform poorly with 
regards to global payoff. In addition, the overall trend is that the larger the coalition is the 
lower is the efficiency index. Larger coalitions actually perform worse than the small ones. 
Likewise, we can see from figure 5.2 that internally stable coalitions also perform relatively 
poorly with regards to abatement. The overall trend is that larger coalitions have lower 
environmental indexes. This means that larger coalitions abate less than the small ones.  
The internal stability condition (the left-hand side of equation (3.11)) for each member of the 
coalition is illustrated by the IS column in tables 5.2 through 5.9. The numbers represent each 
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member’s net gain from being a member of the coalition. If the net gain is positive for all 
members, they all want to stay in the coalition and the coalition is internally stable. The net 
gain has been calculated for each member of each of the 65 519 possible coalitions using 
Holtsmark’s spreadsheets.   
The best performing internally stable coalition, both with regards to global payoff and global 
abatement, is a coalition with only two members; China and the US (table 5.2 below). It has 
an efficiency index of 0.1526; the coalition provides only 15% of the maximum achievable 
welfare gain of an agreement between these 16 countries. The environmental index is 0.1297. 
  
Payoff Abatement IS 
 
GLOBAL 1.958619 0.277823 - 
1 China 0.574723 0.187873 0.084941 
2 United States 0.431545 0.055461 0.063025 
3 European Union 0.861032 0.014103 - 
4 Russian Federation 0.176006 0.016410 - 
5 India 0.073855 0.003082 - 
6 Japan -0.287134 -0.000777 - 
7 Canada 0.025890 0.000059 - 
8 Korea, Rep. -0.108047 -0.000109 - 
9 Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.003546 0.000036 - 
10 Mexico 0.013530 0.000051 - 
11 South Africa 0.019010 0.000104 - 
12 Australia -0.011874 -0.000018 - 
13 Saudi Arabia 0.001223 0.000010 - 
14 Brazil 0.044062 0.000085 - 
15 Ukraine 0.059558 0.001133 - 
16 Indonesia 0.081694 0.000321 - 
Table 5.2 – The overall best performing internally stable coalition  (BIS): 
China and the US  
Countries marked in bold are members of the coalition  
A coalition is IS if all the numbers in the IS column are ≥ 0. 
A coalition is PIS if the sum of all numbers in the IS column is ≥ 0 
IS: Internal stability. PIS: Potential internal stability 
Source: Holtsmark’s spreadsheets (2013), based on my own calculations reported in table (4.4) 
As we can see, the numbers in the IS column are positive for both members, confirming that 
this coalition is in fact internally stable.  
Looking at figure 5.1 and 5.2, we see that there are several internally stable coalitions with a 
large number of members. The largest coalitions have as many as 11 members. One of these 
is presented in table 5.3 below; Russia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Iran, Mexico, South 
Africa, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Ukraine and Indonesia are members of this coalition. 
This large coalition (LIS) has an environmental index of -0,0227 and an efficiency index of    
-0,0515. 
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Payoff Abatement IS 
 
GLOBAL 1.285669 0.159617 - 
1 China 0.414976 0.018904 - 
2 United States 0.329836 0.018904 - 
3 European Union 0.485145 0.014103 - 
4 Russian Federation 0.104196 -0.000223 0.001336 
5 India 0.042257 0.003082 - 
6 Japan -0.164736 -0.000007 0.042676 
7 Canada 0.014874 0.000059 - 
8 Korea, Rep. -0.062064 -0.000002 0.006164 
9 Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.002037 -0.000025 0.000006 
10 Mexico 0.007774 -0.000009 0.000093 
11 South Africa 0.010924 -0.000014 0.000181 
12 Australia -0.006822 -0.000004 0.000074 
13 Saudi Arabia 0.000702 -0.000020 0.000001 
14 Brazil 0.025319 -0.000005 0.001015 
15 Ukraine 0.034287 -0.000047 0.001525 
16 Indonesia 0.046962 -0.000010 0.003421 
Table 5.3 – An internally stable coalition with 11 members (LIS) 
Countries marked in bold are members of the coalition  
A coalition is IS if all the numbers in the IS column are ≥ 0 
A coalition is PIS if the sum of all numbers in the IS column is ≥ 0 
IS: Internal stability. PIS: Potential internal stability 
Source: Holtsmark’s spreadsheets (2013), based on my own calculations reported in table (4.4) 
Looking at the IS column confirms that this coalition is in fact internally stable. The coalitions 
efficiency index and environmental index are negative; it has a lower global payoff and a 
lower global abatement than the non-cooperative solution (see table 5.1). In fact, taking a 
closer look at the abatement column, we see that the actual abatement level is negative for all 
members; the coalition members actually increase their emissions relative to the BaU level. 
The worst performing internally stable coalition with regards to both global payoff and global 
abatement (WIS) is presented in table 5.4 below. Russia, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, 
Mexico, South Africa and Ukraine are members of this coalition. This coalition has an 
efficiency index of -0.0817 and an environmental index of -0.0356; the coalition results in an 
even lower global payoff and lower global abatement than the coalition from table 5.3.  
As many as 83% of all internally stable coalitions have negative efficiency indexes and 84% 
have negative environmental indexes (see figures 5.1 and 5.2). This implies that both in terms 
of global abatement and global payoff no cooperation would be preferable in some cases. 
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Payoff Abatement IS 
 
GLOBAL 1.185909 0.149645 - 
1 China 0.372623 0.123834 - 
2 United States 0.307934 0.018904 - 
3 European Union 0.453437 0.014103 - 
4 Russian Federation 0.097330 -0.004244 0.000209 
5 India 0.039839 -0.001947 0.001334 
6 Japan -0.154455 -0.000127 0.047426 
7 Canada 0.013944 0.000059 - 
8 Korea, Rep. -0.058190 -0.000048 0.006836 
9 Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.001910 0.000036 - 
10 Mexico 0.007273 -0.000176 0.000081 
11 South Africa 0.010220 -0.000257 0.000163 
12 Australia -0.006396 -0.000018 - 
13 Saudi Arabia 0.000659 0.000010 - 
14 Brazil 0.023730 0.000085 - 
15 Ukraine 0.032070 -0.000891 0.001470 
16 Indonesia 0.043981 0.000321 - 
Table 5.4– The overall worst performing internally stable coalition (WIS) 
Countries marked in bold are members of the coalition  
A coalition is IS if all the numbers in the IS column are ≥ 0. 
A coalition is PIS if the sum of all numbers in the IS column is ≥ 0 
IS: Internal stability. PIS: Potential internal stability 
Source: Holtsmark’s spreadsheets (2013), based on my own calculations reported in table (4.4) 
5.3 Potentially internally stable coalitions 
Looking again at figure 5.1 we see that while the internally stable coalitions generally perform 
badly, there are many potentially internally stable coalitions that perform relatively well. A 
coalition is potentially internally stable if the potential internal stability condition (equation 
(3.13)) holds; the sum of the net gains of cooperation for all members of a coalition must be 
positive. Thus, the coalition is potentially internally stable if the sum of the net gains for each 
member (found in the IS column in tables 5.2 through 5.9) is positive. 
The potentially internally stable coalition with the highest efficiency index (BeffPIS) – equal 
to 0.8735 – is a coalition consisting of 14 members (only the US and the Republic of Korea 
are not members). This coalition has an environmental index of 0.7081 and is depicted in 
table 5.5 below.  
The sum of the net gains of cooperation for all members is positive – confirming that the 
coalition is potentially internally stable. The countries with positive net gains must pay the 
countries with negative net gains to stay in the agreement. In this case China, the EU and 
Japan have to make side payments to Russia, India, Canada, Iran, Mexico, South Africa, 
46 
 
Australia, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Ukraine and Indonesia in order to entice them to be part of the 
coalition. 
  
 
Payoff Abatement IS 
  GLOBAL 4.336650 0.726573 - 
1 China 2.113581 0.238132 0.813297 
2 United States 1.575155 0.018904 - 
3 European Union 2.162504 0.036225 0.776219 
4 Russian Federation -0.364241 0.205328 -0.683650 
5 India -0.190390 0.094178 -0.354485 
6 Japan -0.774981 0.006148 0.059648 
7 Canada 0.046765 0.005130 -0.019729 
8 Korea, Rep. -0.282534 -0.000109 - 
9 Iran, Islamic Rep. -0.085744 0.023267 -0.094709 
10 Mexico 0.000634 0.008510 -0.034137 
11 South Africa -0.000990 0.012418 -0.049471 
12 Australia -0.045215 0.003468 -0.014154 
13 Saudi Arabia -0.072806 0.018610 -0.075920 
14 Brazil 0.097363 0.004380 -0.015033 
15 Ukraine -0.019882 0.043085 -0.163069 
16 Indonesia 0.177431 0.008898 -0.026362 
Table 5.5 – The potentially internally stable coalition with the highest 
efficiency index (BeffPIS) 
Countries marked in bold are members of the coalition  
A coalition is IS if all the numbers in the IS column are ≥ 0. 
A coalition is PIS if the sum of all numbers in the IS column is ≥ 0 
IS: Internal stability. PIS: Potential internal stability 
Source: Holtsmark’s spreadsheets (2013), based on my own calculations reported in table (4.4) 
We can see from figure 5.2 that many potentially internally stable coalitions perform 
relatively well with regards to global abatement. This means that if we allow for side 
payments in this model, the countries are able to accomplish quite a lot in terms of global 
abatement through international negotiations. 
The potentially internally stable coalition resulting in the highest level of global abatement 
(BenvPIS) is a coalition consisting of 11 members (including all countries except Canada, 
Mexico, Brazil, Ukraine and Indonesia). The coalition has an environmental index of 0.8012. 
The efficiency index for this coalition is 0.8670 and is presented in table 5.6 below. 
As we can see from the IS column the coalition is not internally stable without side payments. 
The sum of the net gains for all members is, however, positive; the coalition is potentially 
internally stable if we allow for side payments between members. Here China, the US, the 
EU, Japan and the Republic of Korea have to make side payments to Russia, India, Iran, 
South Africa, Australia and Saudi Arabia in order to entice them to be part of the coalition.  
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    Payoff Abatement IS 
 
GLOBAL 4.315074 0.798826 - 
1 China 2.168267 0.267232 0.690418 
2 United States 1.393079 0.078888 0.169053 
3 European Union 2.353897 0.040651 0.755139 
4 Russian Federation -0.534538 0.230419 -0.884599 
5 India -0.270819 0.105687 -0.451129 
6 Japan -0.856062 0.006899 0.052699 
7 Canada 0.074448 0.000059 - 
8 Korea, Rep. -0.322427 0.002579 0.000262 
9 Iran, Islamic Rep. -0.109464 0.026110 -0.119314 
10 Mexico 0.038904 0.000051 - 
11 South Africa -0.009198 0.013936 -0.062518 
12 Australia -0.051976 0.003892 -0.017845 
13 Saudi Arabia -0.092198 0.020885 -0.095620 
14 Brazil 0.126705 0.000085 - 
15 Ukraine 0.171474 0.001133 - 
16 Indonesia 0.234982 0.000321 - 
Table 5.6 – The potentially internally stable coalition with the highest 
environmental index (BenvPIS) 
Countries marked in bold are members of the coalition  
A coalition is IS if all the numbers in the IS column are ≥ 0. 
A coalition is PIS if the sum of all numbers in the IS column is ≥ 0 
IS: Internal stability. PIS: Potential internal stability 
Source: Holtsmark’s spreadsheets (2013), based on my own calculations reported in table (4.4) 
 
  
Payoff Abatement IS 
 
GLOBAL 1.042589 0.135826 - 
1 China 0.313928 0.123834 - 
2 United States 0.277581 0.018904 - 
3 European Union 0.409494 0.014103 - 
4 Russian Federation 0.085185 -0.013232 -0.009756 
5 India 0.034712 -0.006069 -0.001365 
6 Japan -0.140287 -0.000396 0.045176 
7 Canada 0.012656 0.000059 - 
8 Korea, Rep. -0.052852 -0.000148 0.006494 
9 Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.001339 -0.001499 -0.000407 
10 Mexico 0.006614 0.000051 - 
11 South Africa 0.009292 0.000104 - 
12 Australia -0.005864 -0.000223 0.000029 
13 Saudi Arabia 0.000282 -0.001199 -0.000320 
14 Brazil 0.021538 0.000085 - 
15 Ukraine 0.029055 0.001133 - 
16 Indonesia 0.039916 0.000321 - 
Table 5.7 – The overall worst performing coalition (WT) 
Countries marked in bold are members of the coalition  
A coalition is IS if all the numbers in the IS column are ≥ 0. 
A coalition is PIS if the sum of all numbers in the IS column is ≥ 0 
IS: Internal stability. PIS: Potential internal stability 
Source: Holtsmark’s spreadsheets (2013), based on my own calculations reported in table (4.4) 
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The overall worst performing coalition (WT) – both with respect to global payoff and global 
abatement – is also potentially internally stable. This is confirmed by closely examining the IS 
in table 5.7 above. No coalition, potentially internally stable or not, has lower global payoff or 
a lower level of global abatement than this coalition. It has an efficiency index of -0.1252 and 
an environmental index of -0.0534. 
As we see from the table someone has to make side payments to Russia, India, Iran and Saudi 
Arabia to entice them to be part of the coalition. Japan, the Republic of Korea and Australia 
are willing to pay because they have negative benefit parameters, meaning that they actually 
benefit from increased emissions.  
 
5.4 Non-internally stable coalitions 
The best performing coalitions, including the social optimum, are not potentially internally 
stable. In fact, 1.5% of all possible coalitions outperform the best potentially internally stable 
coalition with regards to global payoff (BeffPIS), while approximately 3% of all possible 
coalitions result in a higher level of global abatement than the potentially internally stable 
coalition with the highest level of abatement (BenvPIS).  
There are also as many as 404 coalitions (none of which are potentially internally stable) that 
result in a higher level of global abatement than the level of global abatement we get in the 
socially optimal outcome (where global payoff is maximized).  
The coalition resulting in the overall highest level of global abatement (Benv) is presented in 
table 5.8 below. No coalition, potentially stable or not, has higher global abatement than this 
coalition. The coalition’s environmental index is 1.1586 and the efficiency index is 0.9527.  
The coalition has 14 members; only Japan and the Republic of Korea are not part of the 
coalition. As we can see the environmental index is larger than one; the coalition results in a 
higher level of global abatement than the socially optimal outcome. The coalition is not 
potentially internally stable.  
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Payoff Abatement IS 
 
GLOBAL 4.597633 1.076167 - 
1 China 2.6776952 0.332261 0.434021 
2 United States 1.8048946 0.098084 0.050215 
3 European Union 3.1341173 0.050543 0.761101 
4 Russian Federation -0.9299623 0.286490 -1.421256 
5 India -0.4610915 0.131405 -0.708127 
6 Japan -1.1110817 -0.000777 - 
7 Canada 0.0595108 0.007158 -0.039308 
8 Korea, Rep. -0.4184661 -0.000109 - 
9 Iran, Islamic Rep. -0.1712460 0.032463 -0.184555 
10 Mexico -0.0152440 0.011873 -0.066858 
11 South Africa -0.0250824 0.017327 -0.097116 
12 Australia -0.0735651 0.004839 -0.027608 
13 Saudi Arabia -0.1432268 0.025967 -0.147847 
14 Brazil 0.1358811 0.006111 -0.031497 
15 Ukraine -0.1113816 0.060116 -0.325644 
16 Indonesia 0.2458815 0.012416 -0.059055 
Table 5.8 – The coalition with the highest environmental index (Benv) 
Countries marked in bold are members of the coalition  
A coalition is IS if all the numbers in the IS column are ≥ 0 
A coalition is PIS if the sum of all numbers in the IS column is ≥ 0 
IS: Internal stability. PIS: Potential internal stability 
Source: Holtsmark’s spreadsheets (2013), based on my own calculations reported in table (4.4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Payoff Abatement IS 
 
GLOBAL 4.570955 1.075331 - 
1 China 2.659917 0.333507 0.417426 
2 United States 1.798858 0.098452 0.044775 
3 European Union 3.129295 0.050733 0.755246 
4 Russian Federation -0.942775 0.287564 -1.433003 
5 India -0.466941 0.131897 -0.713652 
6 Japan -1.110219 -0.000777 - 
7 Canada 0.059126 0.007185 -0.039616 
8 Korea, Rep. -0.418141 -0.000109 - 
9 Iran, Islamic Rep. -0.172647 0.032585 -0.185943 
10 Mexico -0.015793 0.011918 -0.067365 
11 South Africa -0.025882 0.017392 -0.097855 
12 Australia -0.045957 -0.000018 - 
13 Saudi Arabia -0.144342 0.026064 -0.148958 
14 Brazil 0.135487 0.006134 -0.031765 
15 Ukraine -0.114135 0.060341 -0.328189 
16 Indonesia 0.245104 0.012462 -0.059609 
Table 5.9 – The coalition without Japan, the Republic of Korea and Australia 
(exJKA) 
Countries marked in bold are members of the coalition  
A coalition is IS if all the numbers in the IS column are ≥ 0  
A coalition is PIS if the sum of all numbers in the IS column is ≥ 0 
IS: Internal stability. PIS: Potential internal stability 
Source: Holtsmark’s spreadsheets (2013), based on my own calculations reported in table (4.4) 
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The coalition consisting only of members with positive benefit parameters (i.e. excluding 
Japan, the Republic of Korea and Australia) (exJAK) is presented in table 5.9 above. The 
efficiency index is 0.9446 and the environmental index is 1.1576. This coalition is interesting 
because the three excluded countries are the three countries with negative benefit parameters; 
this means that they actually benefit from emissions of CO2 (see table 4.4). This should imply 
that a coalition without these three countries is able to abate more than the socially optimal 
coalition, where the three countries' benefits have to be considered when the coalition 
members maximize their joint payoff. As we can see from the environmental index, this 
coalition does lead to a higher global abatement than in the socially optimal coalition. It does 
not, however, result in higher global abatement than the coalition excluding only Japan and 
the Republic of Korea presented in table 5.8 (see discussion in the following section).  
5.5 Interpretation and discussion 
Table 5.10 provides a summary of the ten coalitions presented earlier in this chapter. Looking 
at the environmental index we see that three of the coalitions result in lower global abatement 
than the non-cooperative outcome. Two of the coalitions also result in higher abatement 
globally than the socially optimal outcome. While all of the 'ill-performing' coalitions are 
potentially internally stable (two of them are even internally stable without side payments), 
none of the coalitions abating more than the social optimum are. 
Coalition Table Global payoff Global abatement Ieff Ienv IS PIS 
WTa) 5.7 1.0426 0.1358 -0.1252 -0.0534 No Yes 
WISb) 5.4 1.1859 0.1496 -0.0817 -0.0356 Yes Yes 
LISc) 5.3 1.2857 0.1596 -0.0515 -0.0227 Yes Yes 
BaUd) 5.1 1.4554 0.1772 0 0 Yes Yes 
BISe) 5.2 1.9586 0.2778 0.1526 0.1297 Yes Yes 
BeffPISf) 5.5 4.3367 0.7266 0.8735 0.7081 No Yes 
BenvPISg) 5.6 4.3151 0.7988 0.8670 0.8012 No Yes 
SOh) 5.1 4.7537 0.9531 1 1 No No 
exJKAi) 5.9 4.5710 1.0753 0.9446 1.1576 No No 
Benvj) 5.8 4.5976 1.0762 0.9527 1.1586 No No 
Table 5.10: Results for ten key coalitions 
a)
 The worst performing coalition of them all (global payoff and global abatement), 
b)
 The worst performing internally stable coalition (global 
payoff and global abatement), 
 c)
 An internally stable coalition with 11 members, 
d)
 The non-cooperative outcome, 
e)
 The best internally stable 
coalition (global payoff and global abatement), 
f)
 The best potentially internally stable coalition (global payoff only), 
g)
 The best  potentially 
internally stable coalition (global abatement only), 
h)
 The socially optimal outcome, 
i)
 The coalition excluding only Japan, Korea, Rep. and 
Australia, 
j)
 The best coalition of them all (global abatement only) 
Ieff : Efficiency index.  Ienv : Environmental index. IS: Internal stability. PIS: Potential internal stability 
Sorted by the environmental index 
Source: Holtsmark’s spreadsheets (2013), based on my own calculations reported in table (4.4) 
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Table 5.10 confirms that the best performing internally stable coalition (BIS) performs rather 
poorly in terms of relative global abatement, while the best performing potentially internally 
stable coalitions (BeffPIS and BenvPIS) both achieve a lot in terms of relative global 
abatement. 
Holtsmark (2013) has done a similar analysis for the 16 world regions from the FUND model 
presented by Osmani and Tol (2009). While his results are similar to the results presented in 
this thesis, there were fewer both internally and potentially internally stable coalitions – with 
somewhat lower efficiency indexes (Holtsmark, 2013, p. 339). 
Overall, the results of the analysis in this thesis are encouraging. Many of the possible 
coalitions are potentially internally stable. In addition, a lot of these coalitions perform rather 
well, both in terms of global payoff and in terms of global abatement (see figures 5.1 and 5.2). 
By allowing for side payments we get very close to the socially optimal outcome, both with 
regards to payoff and abatement.    
The results for internally stable coalitions are less encouraging. While we do get larger 
internally stable coalitions when countries are heterogeneous than when they are 
homogeneous (recall that the largest internally stable coalition had only three members in the 
case with 16 identical countries), these large coalitions have lower gains – both in terms of 
global payoff and global abatement – than the best performing internally stable coalitions with 
only two or three members. A lot of the internally stable coalitions actually perform worse 
than the case with no cooperation; both the efficiency indexes and the environmental indexes 
are below zero.  
The main trend for internally stable coalitions is that larger coalitions abate less than the small 
ones. This is consistent with the theoretical results presented in the paper by Pavlova and de 
Zeeuw (2012). 
When the benefit of each individual country depends only on global abatement and the 
existing coalition is large, the contribution of one individual country matters little in the 
aggregate and each country has an increased incentive to free-ride on the abatement effort of 
others (i.e. to be non-members to an agreement). The coalitions with high gains of 
cooperation in terms of abatement are therefore not internally stable. This result is consistent 
with the claim Barrett (2003) makes; there is a trade-off between the depth (how well a 
coalition performs) and the breadth (how many members the coalition has) of cooperation. 
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However, internal stability is only one of the conditions a coalition must satisfy in order to be 
self-enforcing. I have in this thesis not considered whether or not any of the coalitions are 
externally stable. This condition imposes further restrictions on the set of attainable coalitions 
(i.e. coalitions that are self-enforcing). But, looking back at section 3.2, we see that the 
external stability condition is less restrictive than the internal stability condition for 
homogeneous countries. In fact, all coalitions with two or more members are externally stable 
when countries are identical.  
While this result is not directly applicable to a situation where countries are different, at least 
it gives us an idea of what to expect. External stability implies that non-members have no 
interest in joining an existing coalition. That large coalitions are externally stable is consistent 
with the fact that countries are non-members because they want to free-ride on the abatement 
efforts of others. In already large coalitions the contribution of one additional country matters 
little in terms of global abatement, making it more likely that the country will benefit from 
simply staying out of the coalition, getting the benefit of the abatement effort of the coalition 
but not having to pay the cost of increased abatement itself. 
Only Japan, the Republic of Korea and Australia should want to join a large coalition with 
high abatement; simply to reduce that coalition’s abatement level. They are in some cases 
willing to pay other countries to impose subsidies to emission generation. Their benefit 
parameters are negative, so they actually gain from decreased abatement. As we saw from the 
results presented above, the coalition excluding Japan, the Republic of Korea and Australia 
actually abates more than the socially optimal coalition. This is because when a coalition 
maximizes their aggregated payoff with respect to abatement, the inclusion of a country with 
a negative benefit parameter reduces the optimal abatement level for the coalition as a whole. 
It is, however, interesting to note that the coalition that results in the highest level of 
abatement overall (see table 5.8) actually includes Australia (though not Japan and the 
Republic of Korea). While Australia itself does not profit from higher abatement, Australia’s 
benefit parameter is close to zero (see table 4.4) and when their joint payoffs are maximized 
the gain the other coalition members recieve from high abatement outweighs Australia’s small 
individual loss. This coalition is not potentially internally stable; even though the coalition's 
joint payoff is maximized, the gains of cooperation are not large enough to compensate the 
countries that do not gain from being part of the coalition. 
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It is also interesting to note that some coalitions (whether they are (potentially) internally 
stable or not) abate less and result in a lower global payoff than the non-cooperative outcome 
because there are countries with negative benefit parameters in the model. All coalitions with 
negative efficiency and environmental indexes include at least one of those three countries. 
The worst internally stable coalition, both in terms of global abatement and global payoff 
(WIS), includes Japan and the Republic of Korea (see table 5.4), while the worst performing 
coalition of them all, also in terms of both global abatement and global payoff (WT), includes 
all three countries as members (see table 5.7). This coalition is potentially internally stable; 
Japan, the Republic of Korea and Australia make side payments to the other four members to 
entice them to be part of this ‘bad’ coalition (see table 5.6).  
While Japan, the Republic of Korea and Australia are the main contributors to the bad results, 
China, the US and the EU contribute to most of the well-performing coalitions. The best 
performing internally stable coalition in terms of both global payoff and global abatement 
(BIS) consist of only China and the US (see table 5.2). This implies that negotiations between 
only these two countries could yield good results. 
China and the EU are members of the best performing potentially internally stable coalition in 
terms of payoff (BeffPIS). They make side payments to other members to entice them to be 
part of the coalition (see table 5.4).  The potentially stable coalition resulting in the highest 
level of abatement (BenvPIS) includes also includes China, the US and the EU. These three 
make side payments to other members of the coalition (see table 5.5).  
Interestingly, Japan also makes side payments to the other members in both of these coalitions 
(and the Republic of Korea does so in the BenvPIS coalition). This implies that while these 
coalitions are the best performing (potentially internally stable) coalitions, Japan (and the 
Republic of Korea) is actually paying the other members in the coalition to abate less than 
they would have if Japan was not a member of the coalition.  
While side payments allow for much larger coalitions with relatively high both global 
abatement and global payoff by making recipients more inclined to become members, they 
make the donors worse off. In addition to making the side payments less credible, there may 
also be some moral complications if the countries receiving the side payments are financially 
better off than the donors. However, according to the results presented in this thesis, the 
countries making the side payments are actually what we consider to be relatively rich 
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countries. China, the US, the EU and Japan are countries making side payments, while 
countries such as India, South Africa and Indonesia are the recipients. 
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6 Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis has been to calculate the cost and benefit parameters in a linear 
benefit/quadratic cost model of international climate negotiations for 16 individual countries 
and solve the model in order to analyze the stability properties of the possible coalitions.  
The European Union and the 15 specific countries were chosen because they had the highest 
emissions of CO2 in 2005. The parameters were calculated from 16 world region parameters 
presented in a paper by Osmani and Tol (2009), and the model was solved using a spreadsheet 
developed by Bjart Holtsmark (2013). This is a partial analysis, where the terms global and 
social optimum apply to a world consisting only of these 16 countries.  
Holtsmark’s spreadsheets (2013) calculate the payoffs and abatement level for each country in 
each of the 65 519 possible coalitions assuming that the coalition countries agree to maximize 
their joint payoff, as well as the outcome where no countries cooperate.  The spreadsheets also 
calculate the global payoff and the global abatement for each coalition and rate the coalitions 
according to global payoff and global abatement – relative to global payoff and global 
abatement in the two extremes where no one cooperates and where everyone cooperates – 
using two indexes; the efficiency index (which measures global payoff) and the 
environmental index (which measures global abatement). In addition, the spreadsheets reveal 
which coalitions are internally and potentially internally stable. 
One result of this calculation is that relatively few coalitions are internally stable (without side 
payments) but that the majority of the coalitions are potentially internally stable when side 
payments are introduced. 
The internally stable coalitions generally achieve little, both in terms of relative global payoff 
and relative global abatement. In addition, the smaller internally stable coalitions clearly 
outperform the larger ones – both with respect to relative global payoff and relative global 
abatement.  
How does this translate to the real world? The results on internal stability imply that small 
coalitions perform better than large coalitions (in terms of both global abatement and global 
payoff). The best performing internally stable coalition is a coalition consisting only of China 
and the US. Hence, perhaps it would be optimal to let China and the US negotiate alone, 
rather than to aim for a broad coalition worldwide. 
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However, if the possibility for side payments is included, the picture is much brighter. Many 
of the potentially internally stable coalitions actually do quite well. While none outperform 
the grand coalition (were all countries cooperate and maximize their joint payoff) some are 
quite close. The reason is that when side payments are allowed, the countries that gain from 
cooperation are able to compensate countries that would otherwise loose and not be part of the 
coalition. This increases the set of attainable coalitions, and by cooperating the countries are 
able to achieve a lot in terms of relative global abatement. 
Still, some questions remain. While internal stability is arguably the most ‘important’ stability 
condition – keeping countries outside a coalition is easier than forcing countries to join – it 
would be interesting to find out which of the 65 519 coalitions are externally stable. It would 
also be interesting to see how the stability of the coalitions change if the benefit parameters of 
Japan, South Korea and Australia, no longer take negative values. Would we perhaps get 
fewer but better performing internally stable coalitions? The grand coalition itself should at 
least result in a higher level of abatement. 
It would also be interesting to be able to say something about the abatement levels in more 
absolute terms. While I claim that many potentially internally stable coalitions perform well 
relative to the grand coalition, I do not make any absolute claims about the level of abatement 
in the grand coalition itself. While the grand coalition is the coalition that maximizes global 
payoff with respect to abatement,
 29
 the resulting optimal level of abatement may or may not 
be able to reduce the risk of global warming.  
 
                                                                
29 The objective of a coalition in this thesis is to maximize their joint payoff with respect to abatement. Global abatement is the sum off all 
countries’ payoffs (whether they are part of the coalition or not). 
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